(N° I.)

ESSAYS

AND

REFLECTIONS

ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS OF

POLITICS AND SCIENCE.

By ROBERT YOUNG.

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☞ The Number on the Title Page, refers to the order of Publication of the Pamphlet; thoſe in the body of the Work, to the arrangement of the ſeveral ſubjects. Where, as in the preſent Number the concluſion is abrupt, the ſame ſubject will follow in continuation, in the ſucceeding Number.

Advertiſement.

THE Eſſays now about to appear beore the Public, have lain by me, owing to various circumſtances, unnoticed for a conſiderable time; ſome of them for ten or twelve years. They were written merely as rough materials, deſigned to be arranged into a very extenſive ſyſtem; but it is found expedient to lay them before the world in their rude ſtate. If the Public opinion ſhould ſtamp ſuch a value upon them as to give them a claim upon my further attention, I pro-

a poſe,

poſe, at a future time, to attempt a more ſyſtematic work, on the ſame ſubjects. (a)

As my avocations do not afford even the ſmall time neceſſary to ſelect the Manuſcripts and correct the preſs, at other than detached and uncertain intervals, I am obliged to ſend theſe productions out in ſeperate numbers.

It may not be improper to add, that theſe Eſſays have a near relation to the plan of the PHILANTHROPIC SOCIETY. That plan aroſe gradually out of the ſame habits and ſeries of thoughts which produced, together with it, theſe more general inveſtigations of man and ſociety at large.

Several reaſons concur to render it in my

(a) Intended to be a ſeries of Volumes in continuation of an Eſſay on the Powers and Mechaniſm of Nature. Publiſhed about two years ſince.

my view proper to publiſh theſe looſe and detached papers in their original ſtate; and it may be expected that I ſhould advance thoſe reaſons, for a conduct which may ſeem to require ſome apology; that is for publiſhing now, with all its imperfections, a work which I have a deſign in future to endeavour to improve.

In the firſt place the work in its preſent ſtate appears to me to contain a great deal of very important matter, which cannot fail to be uſeful, and which therefore ought not to be delayed for the uncertain event of any future deſign.

In the ſecond place, by methodiſing a great maſs of ideas, many ſentiments and modes of expreſſion in themſelves worth preſerving, muſt be neceſſarily loſt, becauſe

becauſe they could not be adapted to the rigour of ſyſtematic order.

Thirdly, I am not certain that the advantages of method could over-balance theſe ſacrifices, nor certain that a more regular work which I might form, would yet be a more uſeful one.

Fourthly, there are at leaſt advantages peculiar to both forms. A detached and miſcellaneous work, more looſely written, and conveying ideas in the ſame manner and terms as they originally occurred, can be read with leſs ſtudy, and is more adapted to thoſe who require relaxation and amuſement, together with information.

Fifthly, I am not certain of ever being able to accompliſh my purpoſe of writing a large ſyſtematic work; for I am engaged

engaged in other deſigns (beſides a retroſpective on my paſt labours) which alone are perhaps counting too much on the ſtability of human affairs, and the certainty of life.

The ſubjects of the following Eſſays are Metaphyſics, Philoſophy, Politics, Mathematics, Ethics, and other miſcellaneous mattters; ſome of which, as well as ſome ſubjects of a temporary nature that I may occaſionally introduce, could hardly be admitted at all, in a ſyſtematic work. They are variouſly written. Some in the form of Aphoriſms; ſome in a more familiar ſtyle of reaſoning; ſome in language coming from the heart, and addreſſed to it.

They embrace a very extenſive ſcope of

of enquiry, into the firſt principles, and general ſources of human knowledge.

They were originally deſigned to trace the connecting links which form the univerſe into one great chain of being, which unite corporeal and ſpiritual exiſtences, the natural and political world, and ſhew the one immenſe organized and living maſs of creation to be a ſingle emanation proceeding from the living eſſence of the ſupreme and firſt cauſe. I am conſcious that the work muſt fall in execution, far, very far ſhort of ſo bold, perhaps ſo raſh a deſign; but it will be allowed me to ſay, that if I did not believe ſomething uſeful will be found in theſe writings to overbalance their faults, I ſhould be as unpardonably, as fooliſhly employed, in obtruding them on the world in any form.

Eſſays on Various Subjects, &c.

Essay I. on the Poor.

THE maxim in Politics that the ſtrength of a ſtate is proportional to its population, is true conditionally only, that induſtry alſo keeps pace with the increaſe of numbers.

Thoſe in a community who neither poſſeſs nor circulate riches, nor by their labour help towards their acquiſition, can ſcarcely be ſaid to belong to the community, much leſs to conſtitute part of its ſtrength; they are burthens and nuiſances, which, it would be better if they were altogether removed.

It is, then, a grand object of policy to find ſufficient employment for the poor, that inſtead

ſtead of meerly helping to conſume, they might contribute towards the ſupply of the public ſtock.

It ſhould ſeem, from the multitudes who ſubſiſt in every country by fortuitous donations, or by worſe means, that the effecting this end, however much to be deſired, muſt be extremely difficult.

In the multifarious concerns of ſociety, and the variety, almoſt infinite of its poſſible combinations, new ideas of order and arangement, cannot fail of ariſing to a reflecting mind, which adverts to the various means of purſuing the ſame end. It is the duty of every member of a community to contribute all in his power towards its proſperity, whether by his conduct in the ſtation he fills, or by communicating to others the reſult of his reflections, when they afford a proſpect of being uſeful.

To whatever cauſe it may be owing that ſuch numbers in almoſt every country, eat the bread of idleneſs or of diſhoneſty, and however difficult may be a full and entire remedy, there can be little doubt that it may be practicable to diminiſh the evil, and in this particular

cular further improve the condition of ſociety, as yet ſo far ſhort of its poſſible perfection. There are two ways in which ſociety may receive improvement. From government, and from individuals. Government benefits a community by wiſe and good laws, by preſerving order, peace and ſecurity. Individuals ſerve and benefit the public inaſmuch as they concur with the good intention of the laws, and each gives his endeavour to render them valid and effectual. It is in proportion as theſe two things combine, that a community proſpers. Laws and regulations, however wiſely framed, are inefficacious but in proportion as there is virtue enough in the people to give ſpirit and life to the dead letter. Nor can virtue in the ſubjects avail much to the public weal, if wiſdom and uprightneſs be wanting in the laws, and governors to direct, guide and apply it.

Methinks in inveſtigating the ſource of the evil in queſtion, it ſeems not to have ariſen from any defect in either one or the other of theſe cauſes, neither are good and ſufficient laws, or wiſdom and integrity on the part of government, or virtue ſufficient among the people wanting. It

It has probably ariſen from a concatenation of cauſes reſulting out of the order and combinations of ſociety itſelf, and out of the make and conſtitution of the human mind: From that ſecret, univerſal, and perpetual force by which every individual is urged to endeavour to raiſe himſelf above his neighbours. This principle, the ſource of all induſtry, emulation, virtue, and noble deeds, occaſions that among infinite contending and ſtruggling powers, thoſe which are depreſſed defeated, and ſunk in the attempt, are overwhelmed and cruſhed with the weight of the numbers who have roſe by their depreſſure. The different orders of ſociety make an aſcending gradation, in which the higher ſteps derive their ſupport, firmneſs and elevation from the ſtrength of the lower, and their due order in the gradation. The deſire to aſcend is laudable and praiſe-worthy, but policy and prudence requires that thoſe who ſtand on the higher ſteps ſhould look to the firmneſs of the foundation, ſhould ſtrengthen and ſupport it, that it may not by being cruſhed and giving way, involve them in its ruin.

It is for want of due attention to this circumſtance, it is from the ardour with which men purſue their riſing proſpects, forgeting and neglecting the condition of thoſe below them, that ſuch multitudes who ought to form the firſt broad and firm ſtep in the ſcale, are bent to the earth, and ſink with them the ſuperior fabric. It is in vain men mount a ladder, which at every round they aſcend, ſinks an equal depth into the earth. The evil then lies in an overſight in mankind, in the hurry and heat of puſhing onward, they omit the due attention to the circumſtance in their outſetting, on which their ſucceſs will much depend. It is an undeniable truth, that the miſery of the poor is the poverty of the commonwealth, as their induſtry and comfort is its wealth. The induſtrious and labouring poor being the firſt ſtep in the ſcale of ſociety, the idle, the vicious, and the miſerable, are but the rubbiſh that lays about it, which contributes nothing to the ſupport or advancing of the ſuperior parts, but tends to decay, rot, and undermine the whole.

There ought then in ſociety to be no claſs below that of the labouring poor; and by as much

much as numbers are by any means ſunk down beneath this claſs, by ſo much is the whole ſociety weakened and depreſſed. The object of policy is then to reſtore the parts thus fallen away, to look back to the foundation ſtep, by conſtant attention to preſerve it from decay, and clear of rubbiſh, and as the fabric riſes in height, to add new ſtrength to the baſis for its ſupport.

The ſyſtem of police for the poor is extremely inadequate and inapplicable to the nature and extent of the evil, as appears in fact by the enormity to which it has ariſen. An examination into the nature of the faults of that ſyſtem, will lead naturally to its remedy. They come under two heads; 1ſt. It does not comprehend the extent of the evil, there being perhaps greater numbers actually deprived (from what cauſe imports not to the fact) than who partake of parochial benefit. 2d. It is inadequate and inſufficient as far as it goes, in that the labour of the poor is not made productive of their maintainance, but ſubjects the nation to a heavy tax.

That

That ſuch numbers of poor are deprived of the benefit the law intends, may be traced to ſeveral obvious reaſons, beſides others to which my information may not lead me. 1ſt. The proviſion is actually inſufficient in reſpect to the number wanting relief. 2d. The weight of poor-rates is ſuch as to induce pariſh officers to diſcourage the poor applying for relief. 3d. The nature of a poor houſe, and of relief afforded is ſuch, as to drive people to ſuffer any extremity, practice any diſhoneſty, and run any hazard, rather than accept of it.

But were there more pariſh work-houſes, and were they filled with greater numbers of poor, ſo as to take in the whole of that deſcription, it is a burthenſome and impolitic proviſion, becauſe the labour of the poor is not made equal to their maintainance; the reaſon of this is, firſt, in the mode of pariſh work-houſes dividing the poor into ſmall detached bodies of a few hundreds at moſt in a place. Second, in the want of a good ſyſtem of policy in each to turn it to the moſt account.

It is a truth eaſily demonſtrable, that the benefit of labour is increaſed by the vicinity of great numbers, and the conſequent facility of their mutual aids; ſo that the more numerous the body, the greater riches will be produced by the ſame labour of an individual, and conſequently the ſum of riches in a body will be greater, not only in proportion as the numbers are greater, but in an increaſed ratio.

Hence cities and populous towns become rich and flouriſhing, while villages, where men toil and labour more, continue poor.

The ſyſtem of pariſh poor is in direct contradiction to this maxim, confirmed equally by reaſon and experience. There is not a ſufficient number of hands collected together, nor can they engage in that circle of arts and manufactures, which by their mutual relations and mutual concurrence, produce a ſaving of labour, and give it a greater value.

Our parochial ſyſtem is deficient in principle, the relief it propoſes being narrow and confined in its own nature, and in the object to which it applies. It is adapted juſt to afford the neceſſaries of life, a bare miſerable exiſtence. Who that has ſeen days of comfort, would

would not rather periſh than enter a work-houſe gate as its inhabitant. It is unworthy the bounty and munificence of a great and wealthy nation; pariſh inſtitutions muſt be narrow and confined in principle as in extent. Let benevolence be the nation's work, and be worthy of it. Let the community at large be the parent of its poor members, and it will not then offer with ſo hard an hand that miſery, itſelf, will ſpurn from it the ſcanty benefit. But let policy, too, direct its meaſures. Let it not encourage idleneſs in its boſom to conſume the fruits of its induſtry; let it manage like a parent, at once affectionate and wiſe; while it ſupplies the wants of its child, let it compel it, to perform its duty too; prudence in rendering a ſervice multiplies the benefit, and directs the influence which liberality gives, to purpoſes of new liberality.

To remedy the evil then, the general plan ariſes from the nature of the faults. The remedy requires two things, the greateſt good to be effected, with the leaſt burden on the community. To do this, we muſt take up the idea in a comprehenſive, and in a political view.

There are two claſſes of poor, thoſe who are, and thoſe who are not able to labour. The queſtion then is how to turn to the beſt account the labour of the former claſs? To this the anſwer is eaſy and incontrovertible: form them into great bodies, and direct their labour to the various articles of wealth, in which, by their vicinity, a reciprocity of benefit may take place in its full extent.

In what way is this to be done? To convert the idle, vicious, and vagabond poor into uſeful and laborious ſubjects, employment muſt be found for them, and offered them on terms which ſhall induce them to accept it. Bribe them by their own intereſt and happineſs, and they will conduce to that of their employers, and of the ſtate.

What the remedy muſt be in its nature and kind, is obvious and plain, from the nature of the evil. The evil is, that multitudes of men and women ſubſiſt on the labour of others, by begging, by diſhoneſt arts, by ſtealing; increaſing the waſte, without contributing to the increaſe of the general ſtock. The remedy conſiſts in finding uſeful employment for them, and inducing them to embrace it. The

manner

manner in which this may be effected, is the only thing at all difficult.

A ſmall degree of reflection may ſerve to evince that the thing is in its nature practicable, and that all the difficulty ariſes from the greatneſs and degree demanding proportionally great exertions.

It is poſſible to engage men to deſert, or to follow any ſpecific mode of conduct by preſenting them with ſtronger motives of ſelf-intereſt for their compliance, than they have for their refuſal.

It is, therefore, poſſible to prevail on an idle man to proſecute ſome uſeful labour, and on a diſhoneſt one to be faithful, by making it their intereſt to be ſo. Thus far the nature of the thing is practicable. But how ſhall means be found to purchaſe the labour of the idle, and the honeſty of villains; will not the price exceed the value of the purchaſe?

If more muſt be given for the labour of one than what will purchaſe the labour of an induſtrious man, if more muſt be given to keep the other honeſt than ſaving by his honeſty will repay, the remedy will become a greater diſeaſe than the one it removes.

We

We are not to conclude that to be impracticable to which no ready and eaſy path lies open. By ſkill and contrivance, by various combinations of powers, by order and arangement of parts, by dependency, connection, by mutual concurrence of ſeveral things, by ſyſtem and method, by a unity of deſign, in numerous concordant operations, human induſtry effects things which aſtoniſh the uninformed beholder, when he compares what he ſees done, with ſuch ſimple and obvious attempts alone, as his notions ſuggeſt to him.

The queſtion involves three conſiderations, 1ſt. In reſpect to the preſent ſtate of adults, in the claſs of perſons under our notice, or thoſe who have begun and formed their habits in the career of vice, the method of reclaiming them. 2d. The different methods to be purſued with children of the ſame, and how far they can be prevented from contracting ſuch habits. 3d. The good diſpoſitions being procured, the ſecuring the means of comfortable ſubſiſtence to ſuch, by providing them employment.

We will now beg leave to ſuppoſe the third object accompliſhed, as it is a neceſſary pre-

requiſite

requiſite to the firſt; and we will ſhew the manner in which it may be done in its due place.

Suppoſe, then, a great undertaking begun, ſufficient to find employment for all the lazy and worthleſs perſons of both ſexes in the kingdom, and of adapting in a very great degree, by the multiplicity of the parts of this undertaking, the kind of labour to every capacity, to the qualifications of ſuch as have learned any trade, and to the different talents and natures of others, whether ingenious or ſtupid. For example, let it be to found a city on ſome of the waſte lands in England, for manufactures and trade, and to cultivate the land about it. The foundation or capital of this undertaking is to be a fund raiſed by voluntary ſubſcription.

Let this city be an aſylum to which all perſons whatever of both ſexes, and of every age or condition, ſhall be invited, on certain conditions, to reſort.

1ſt. The party is to engage himſelf in a legal bond, for a term of years, to be obedient to the lawful orders and rules of the city.

2d. He

2d. He is during that term of years to be entitled to demand and receive a certain ratio of proviſion *per diem*, and a certain value in cloaths, with other neceſſaries to be ſpecified, of lodging, &c. with medicinal care and aſſiſtance when neceſſary.

It is preſumed great numbers would avail themſelves of ſuch a propoſal as this, and on theſe grounds.

1ſt. There are multitudes who in the paths of vice earn an hard and precarious ſubſiſtence, and who ſuffer at times the extremity of miſery, cold and hunger. Whatever may be the diſpoſitions of theſe, however vicious and averſe to labour, neceſſity would outweigh thoſe conſiderations, and a certain and comfortable living offered them, would be a joyful alternative, although with the condition of moderate labour annexed. This applies equally to both ſexes, 2d. While ſuch an aſylum was held out, humanity would dictate a more rigorous exertion of the law in every caſe reſpecting perſons of bad character, becauſe the rigour of the law would then by terrifying numbers, be an additional ſpur to them, urged by fear on the one hand, they would

would more readily fly to the refuge offered them on the other.

As this eſtabliſhment is to be large and comprehenſive, for the purpoſes of the greateſt good to reſult from labour, ſo it is to be free and liberal to induce the poor to accept of it. Inſtead of the confined and gloomy limits of a pariſh workhouſe, let a clean, wholeſom, and well regulated town, invite the poor to its aſylum, where wiſe and judicious regulations obſerve the juſt mean between idleneſs and oppreſſive labour; and where inſtead of being diſpoſed of at the mercy of a few individuals, the overſeers of a pariſh, they ſee the whole nation their benefactors and caring for their good.

In ſuch a city, inhabited by people whom every motive concurred to make induſtrious, and where none were allowed to be idle, multitudes, who in the preſent ſtate of things would paſs their days in that haggard wretchedneſs, in which we ſee ſuch multitudes infecting the earth, and diſgracing our nature, will become uſeful and ornamental members of ſociety, will acquire moderate riches, a comfortable

comfortable ſubſiſtence, and contribute their quota of the public burden to the ſtate.

There are ſeveral characters or deſcriptions of poor, all of which a liberal inſtitution ſhould embrace.

There are poor of learning and talents, who only want the means of becoming uſeful and ornamental to ſociety. There are honeſt and induſtrious poor, who cannot find employment. There are idle and vicious poor who from habits contracted prefer begging and thieving to labour. There are unhappy women whoſe ſufferings are greatly diſproportionate to their crimes. Laſtly, there are thoſe whom the law hath ſentenced to loſs of liberty, and whoſe labours are the juſt property of the community.

In a large and extenſive foundation all of theſe might meet with employment ſuited to their talents and circumſtances.

The ſtate of this colony or town would demand its proper ſyſtem of municipal laws. The army and navy could not exiſt with the liberty that ordinary ſubjects of England enjoy; with the liberty of being idle or induſtrious at pleaſure. Obedience to command

is

is the life and ſoul of theſe bodies. A ſimilar peculiarity muſt characteriſe this inſtitution. It muſt have an organization, an head, and ſubordinate members, and obedience to an authority legally eſtabliſhed, muſt run through the whole.

Nor is ſuch an idea repugnant to our conſtitution. The thing exiſts at preſent; the ſuſpenſion of the liberties of certain claſſes in certain ſituations, from a neceſſity, ariſing out of the ſituation. The neceſſity in the navy and army is obvious; our exiſtence depends on it. In our work-houſes the ſame authority and obedience actually exiſt. The law allows of perſons whom it calls vagrants, being forcibly carried from one place to another, for no crime but poverty, that they may not become a burthen out of their proper pariſh. But it is propoſed this obedience ſhall be voluntary in the firſt inſtance, and ariſe out of the conviction, that liberty in its full extent, under certain circumſtances, is not a bleſſing but a curſe. When it amounts only to the liberty of ſtarving on this dunghil, or on that. That then it is worth while to ſacrifice a portion of their liberty by compact, for

life and real comfort. The law is only required to ratify this agreement; where neceſſity is allowed to juſtify the practice of preſſing, will not the benefit of ſo many thouſands juſtify the thing in queſtion?

How inadequate the preſent ſyſtem of police is to the nature and extent of the object in this particular, the thing itſelf ſpeaks and appears in the magnitude of the evil exiſting —in the objects of wretchedneſs that continually aſſail our eyes and ears, and in thoſe more wretched objects which exiſt, but too truly, in dreadful numbers, retired from public view, where miſery, ſhunning the day, and loathing life, pines in ſecret woe, ſeen only to the few whom chance or charitable curioſity leads to ſeek them out. To enlarge on this evil as it affects the intereſts of ſociety, or as it concerns the feelings of men, would be equally ſuperfluous; I hope it will not be ſo to ſuggeſt a practicable and effectual remedy.

There is another claſs of beings peculiarly entitled in humanity and good policy, to the public care; thoſe children who are yet untainted with vice, but who are born to no other inheritance than iniquity, wretchedneſs and

and diſeaſe. To prevent is both eaſier and better than to cure. To ſnatch from perdition this infant race, and give them to ſociety, would be worthy the bounty of a nation. To root up in them the ſeeds of miſchief, which are continually ſpringing forth in ſuch profuſe crops of vice, and which plagues and infects the community, is what ſound policy directs.

In the propoſed city or colony, 1ſt. neceſſity will not exiſt as a cauſe of diſhoneſty, every one being ſecured of his ration. 2d. Example and emulation, which animate and excite to vice in the commonwealth of thieves, will be removed. The law is to operate on all the ſprings of action in men to the ſame end. 3d. Puniſhment and diſgrace are to attend on vice and idleneſs. 4th. Rewards and badges of honour on induſtry and merit. Theſe rewards are to have different degrees, as are the puniſhments of different kinds; pecuniary indulgencies of reſpect and ornament, permanent as advancement to ſome poſt of ſuperiority.

It is preſumed men will behave well, without any love of virtue, when it is made their intereſt

intereſt to do ſo, and that by the practice itſelf of virtue, men will come to love it.

If emulation, pride, the love of ſuperiority, the love of eaſe, the love of ſociety, of pleaſure, pecuniary inducements; if, on the other hand, ſhame, diſgrace, fear, pain, and hunger, confinement and hard labour, if all theſe motives are, by the aſſiſtance of municipal laws, directed to one object, and that a very practicable one, to induce men to undertake cheerfully a moderate labour, and be faithful to each other; by all theſe motives influencing them at once, former habits and diſpoſitions muſt yield to preſent impreſſions, and ſtronger neceſſities, and at length, by their conſtant operations, they will obliterate thoſe propenſities which are no longer called into exerciſe, and the new manners, at firſt practiſed from neceſſity, will form new habits, and in time be followed from choice.

That ſuch would be the good effects of the methods propoſed, with great numbers, and with the greater number, I believe few who know human nature, and the force of habit in altering diſpoſitions will doubt. Let it be remembered too, that vicious men, and men at war againſt the

the laws of their country, are not devoid of virtuous principles towards each other. They form a diſtinct ſociety and conſider themſelves as at war with the community in which they live; they practice violence, fraud and art, to ſubſiſt on the ſpoils of a common enemy; but in their own community, they have their laws of honour, their principles of faith, and truſt: good diſpoſitions, then, are not wholly eradicated in theſe people, and when they are no longer in a ſtate of warfare, but in a ſituation where their intereſt depends entirely on their merit, they muſt inevitably, and by the natural order of things, be modelled to the circumſtances in which they are; circumſtances and ſituation generally go a great way in forming mens characters.

But there are, it is true, natures ſo ſtubborn as to defy all rules, and who, wanting ſome eſſential feeling of humanity, are irreclaimable; theſe affect not general maxims; it is to be hoped their number is few, and they muſt be dealt with as neceſſity requires.

We have now provided for the treatment of adults, hoping to reclaim many, and to render

render all uſeful, we are next to conſider the caſe of children.

Let the aſylum be open to all children whoſe parents are incapable of making proviſion for them, and thoſe who have no honeſt viſible means of living.

This opens a new and extenſive field for benevolence and policy. The twig is here ſnatched from the poiſonous trunk, and nurtured with wholſome juices. Theſe children will become a race of inhabitants bred up, tutored, and formed in the colony to its diſcipline and laws.

Theſe are to be kept apart in a diſtinct diviſion of the city, without any commerce with the former claſs, but under rigid reſtrictions; and it may be made an object of emulation in the former claſs, to be permitted to reſide in this diviſion, after a certain time of good behaviour, teſtified by their immediate ſuperintendants.

In this diviſion, the laws and regulations calculated for the former claſs, may be diſpenſed with in great meaſure, and the regular ſyſtem of law prevail with ſuch local inſtitutions

tions as may be found uſeful in addition to them.

The third conſideration involved in our queſtion, is reſpecting the means of uſefully employing theſe men. A ſubſcription is to be ſet on foot for voluntary contributions, towards ſo grand and beneficent a purpoſe. The fund raiſed hereby is to be employed in laying the foundation of a town, to be peopled in the manner deſcribed above. The ſtyle of building is to be adapted to the deſign, and for cleanlineſs and air. The people are to be employed either as artificers, huſbandmen, or labourers in the various ways neceſſary for the general comfort and accommodation of labouring poor; or in ſuch undertakings as local circumſtances may point out.

The conſumption of the colony will create a market for the produce of labour—— The labour alſo will exceed the conſumption, and the ſurplus will be a revenue for perpetuating the charity, or for the public ſervice. Amongſt thoſe who have learned no trade, many may be docile and ingenious to learn, to which they may be induced by

by an allowance of a portion of their wages, as their work will be more valuable than that of meer labourers; others will find ample employment as labourers in the building of the town itſelf; in clearing and cultivating land; probably, if local circumſtances permit, in making a navigable canal, for carrying on the commerce of the town. Application may be made to government when the fund is become of ſufficient magnitude, to commence the undertaking, for a grant of a tract of waſte land, ſufficient for containing ſeveral towns, near each other, as the numbers increaſe in the colony by births and new comers, and to parliament, to authoriſe the exerciſe of the municipal law within the aſſigned precincts.

Where the natural genius of youth diſcovers itſelf in a taſte for any particular ſcience or art, or any ſort of extraordinary talents appear, ſuch promiſing diſpoſitions may be cultivated and encouraged. The liberal and fine arts may thus, alſo, ariſe out of the boſom of this charity, and adorn it.

It may be judged not an extravagant eſtimation, that within a term of ten years, arrangements

ments might be made, and a ſettled ſyſtem of labour be eſtabliſhed, counting an hundred thouſand working hands, whoſe labour would produce an average profit, over and above the coſt of their maintainance, of one ſhilling a day; a daily revenue this of 5000l. or 1,565,000l. *per annum*. Out of this, if we allow 20,000l. *per annum*, for ſalaries of officers, and other contingencies, as hoſpitals, a net profit would remain of 1,545,000l. *per annum*, as a revenue to the ſubſcribers, which would ſoon liquidate the capital firſt ſunk, conſidered as a debt; and the colony might be able to bear a tax to government, in addition to thoſe it would pay by its ordinary conſumption of taxed commodities.

It is not however here intended to enter minutely into details and calculations, but to ſpeak to general principles, and the expediency of the thing on the whole.

One principle on which the propoſal reſts is this, That a great number of men purſuing diverſe labours and occupations, will receive a great advantage from being collected in a vicinity, ſo as to facilitate their mutual in-

tercourſe, and the aids men derive from the relations which the arts of life have among themſelves; over an equal number placed in detached parts, and at a diſtance from each other.

This will ſerve to anticipate an objection to the ſcheme, from the fact, that poor-houſes do not, by their labour, ſerve to maintain themſelves; and hence the burden on the nation of the poors-rate.

It happens preciſely from this circumſtance (which we are propoſing in our ſcheme to reform) poor-houſes may be conſidered as ſo many villages ſcattered about the kingdom, in none of which the body is ſufficiently great, for the labour to exceed the expences and produce riches. Our inſtitution propoſes to collect a more weighty body, to form a populous town, in which the ſum of labour ſhall bear a far greater proportion to the attendant expences.

It is not propoſed, however, to interfere at all with the preſent ſyſtem of the poor laws, but to affect thoſe, only, who derive no benefit from them. It adopts a more large and liberal plan; it avoids the evil of pariſh work-houſes;

houſes; it ſhuns alſo thoſe things which drive the poor to ſuffer every extremity rather than ſubmit to them. The confinement within ſuch narrow walls, a ſevere obedience, and an entire ſyſtem dictated by the pariſh officers, who, however well diſpoſed, have not commonly great capacities for government and police.

It propoſes, by an experiment which ſhall not claſh with the regular ſyſtem, to ſhew effectually its error, and induce government, from conviction, at length to adopt ſimilar meaſures with the pariſh-poor.

There are few boſoms ſo devoid of benevolent ſentiments but which commiſerate the diſtreſſes to which they one time or other are witneſſes, without the power of relieving them. And how much greater diſtreſſes are there which retire from view, and ſhun the ſight of man and the eye of unavailing pity.

But to provide a relief for this claſs of unfortunate brethren, is a thing, however deſirable, that has yet been found impracticable. Charitable donations are not alone the remedy wanted. They are but partial and temporary reliefs, which like ardent ſpirits to the hypocondriack, redouble the evil, in the end.

Charities,

Charities, injudicious and indiſcriminate, are even one ſource of the evil, in ſo far as they operate to diminiſh the incitement to induſtry, by opening a door of hope to the idle.

To attempt to alleviate the burdens of the poor, and ſoften their diſtreſſes, by opening the hand of liberality, to an extent adequate to their needs, would be, however great and munificent it might ſhew on its outſide, a moſt pernicious bounty, pregnant with greater evils than thoſe it remedied; rather it would increaſe the evil it was meant to redreſs. It would relax the ſinews of labour, and blunt the zeal of induſtry. The number of needy would increaſe with the increaſe of their ſupplies. It would become a penſion for idleneſs. Thus labour remitted by an ill-timed bounty, the ſprings of wealth would ceaſe to yield their wonted ſupply. The ſtream of liberality would deſtroy the ſource from whence it flowed, till poverty and want became the common level, involving alike the giver and receiver.

Since, therefore, charity, however noble and praiſeworthy in the ſource from whence

it

it proceeds, however amiable and lovely in the human breaſt, ſince it is in its nature a political evil, although a natural good; the policy of ſociety requires that in the diſpenſation of charities, ſome means ſhould be adopted of counteracting their evil tendency, and procuring the good as pure and unmixed as poſſible.

It is owing to the want of ſuch means that a vaſt fund of charity is *ſuppreſſed*, which mens feelings would prompt them to beſtow, but the conviction of its evil and dangerous tendency, requires them to with-hold.

Owing to this, the charities actually given to a vaſt amount, are inadequate to their deſign. And were the whole ſum of beneficence private and public, increaſed ten-fold, and beſtowed meerly in ſupplying the wants and cravings of the poor, whether as a permanent fund like the poor's-rate, or in caſual donations to beggars, or in foundations of any kind, in which induſtry was not the channel and the price of the bounty, it would leave a proportionably greater ſurplus of neceſſitous claimants unprovided for.

For who would work or be thrifty that had hopes of ſharing this extravagant liberality?

Indolent expectancy would ſucceed to active labour. Manufacture and commerce would feel a torpor run through all their members. The donors, exhauſted by giving, would find the ſtreams that ſhould repleniſh their coffers dried up; a general poverty would enſue from ſo impolitic an uſe of wealth. The poor, taught to look to a miſtaken charity, inſtead of looking to themſelves, would expect in vain their accuſtomed ſupplies; and either languiſh in miſery, or be rouſed to deſperation, the ſad effects of an exceſſive and miſguided bounty. What then follows? That the rich ſhould give to the poor; not food, raiment and lodging; but the means of providing theſe things for themſelves. They ſhould give them the implements, the materials, the reward of labour; they ſhould *give* them virtuous habits. They ſhould *brace* and not *relax* the nerves of induſtry. They ſhould ſuffer none to want the means of being induſtrious, and none to feel diſtreſs who either are willing to labour, or whoſe paſt induſtry is reſtrained by ſickneſs or infirmity alone.

This, and only this, is true, efficient charity. Moderate labour, is, in fact, the happi-

neſs

neſs of the poor. It fills up their vacant hours, and redeems their time from pernicious vices. Labour gives that zeſt to their recreations, to their repoſe, and their coarſe and humble diet, that the rich ſeek to derive from ſtudied luxuries and fatiguing diverſions. Labour therefore is the neceſſary requiſite to their enjoyments; nor is the paltry pittance of the poor ſufficient to render a life of idleneſs worth the having. It will therefore appear that by feeding the poor in idleneſs, we only feed their miſery; by providing them the means of induſtry, we enſure their comfort and happineſs.

In all charities theſe cautions ſhould as much as poſſible be regarded; but a double motive exacts their obſervance in the preſent inſtance. The moſt humane cannot view abandoned and profligate characters without ſome ſeverity mixt with the pity which their wretchedneſs excites. A propoſal to relieve ſuch characters by gratuitous donations, would juſtly be univerſally diſregarded, becauſe it would be a propoſal to encourage idleneſs and vice.

But every objection of this kind being obviated,

viated, by the nature of the preſent plan, it preſents to view a deſign, perhaps of all others, the moſt acceptable to an humane mind, at the ſame time that it correſponds with the pureſt maxims of juſt policy.

It is propoſed, only, to offer incitements to the vagrant poor to become induſtrious by making it their intereſt to be ſo; not to countenance their vices, but to buy their return to virtue. Begging, thieving, and proſtitution, have not been alike, profitable to all. There may be numbers who lament perhaps one inconſiderate ſtep; probably an early initiation in wickedneſs, but to whoſe return no door is open. Many ſuch, many even from purer motives, from ſome unextinguiſhed ſparks of virtue, may gladly accept an offered aſylum. If but a few are reſtored to community, their return muſt be grateful to every feeling mind.

What exerciſe of benevolence can be conceived more noble and more pure than reclaiming an abandoned character, and reſtoring to ſociety, and to himſelf, a human being, loſt to both? There is perhaps *one*, the children of theſe unhappy people, beggars, proſtitutes and

and thieves, are doomed to ſhare all their parents miſery, before they come to inherit their crimes. In theſe unfortunate victims of vice exiſt the human form divine, the human ſoul complete—The embryo of reaſon—paſſions, deſires, ſympathies—the ſeeds of virtue and of greatneſs. But they are plants in the hot-bed of impurity, in a ſoil which converts all their wholſome juices into deadly poiſons.

We may anticipate the future crimes of theſe infants, their miſeries and their puniſhments, as inevitable evils which await their preſent innocence, as a doom pronounced before it can have been merited; as penalties rendered certain before it was poſſible to have incurred guilt.

ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS.

No. II.

On the Principles of Law.

I. LAW is a compact expreſſing the terms of peace and union between two or more parties.

If one party be ſuperior, it preſcribes terms, the other accepts or refuſes them.

Compacts purely local or temporary, depending on circumſtances very liable to change, are not generally termed law. Articles of capitulation, articles of peace, determined by the event of war, are not termed laws.

Compacts

Compacts of a more permanent nature, depending on intereſts leſs precarious, become laws.

They may be expreſſed, written, or underſtood. Every man is in compact with his peaceable neighbours. It is by this compact, underſtood, that each relies on the other. That one is deterred from robbing, and murdering others, and perſuades himſelf they will not rob or murder him.

This is a law of ſociety, though no ſtatute expreſs it, or define robbery and murder, or appoint puniſhment.

II. Laws are, then, the condition upon which any body of men ſubſiſt peaceably together, and have an intercourſe of benefits among themſelves.

III. In any body of men or ſociety, the ſuperior power preſcribes laws to the inferior. The inferior accept or rejects the conditions. If the inferior dictates to the ſuperior, it is propoſals, not laws, the ratification of the ſuperior make it law.

The ſuperior power in a body may be no other than the whole collective body; or it may be any part of it.

If

If the whole collective body be the ſuperior power, this power determines the conditions of peace and intercourſe among its members individually, relative to each other. Each individual embraces or rejects the conditions.

If a part of the body be ſuperior to any other part, this ſuperior part, and the remaining part inferior, become two parties, between whom laws expreſs the terms of peace and union.

The ſuperior preſcribes, the inferior altogether rejects or receives, or part receives, part rejects the conditions.

IV. Theſe two or more parties (3) of the firſt diviſion, each being a diſtinct number, a part of the larger number, which all together compoſe, beſides the terms of union or law, ſubſiſting between them, relative to each other, each number within itſelf muſt have laws or terms of union between its own component parts, diſtinct from thoſe laws by which the bodies, as wholes, are united.

V. Each of the parts (3) of a large number, ſuperior and inferior, between themſelves, (6) have within themſelves, laws or terms of union, relative to their own component

ponent parts, which laws are diſtinct from thoſe by which the two bodies, as a whole, are united.

VI. The collective body, relative to its component parts, is always ſuperior. But a body may be divided into two or more parts or numbers, equal or unequal in numbers, of which either number may be ſuperior, or they may be equal between themſelves.

VII. Each of the parts (6) of a large number, ſuperior and inferior between themſelves, or equal between themſelves, having their diſtinct component parts; thoſe component parts may be conſidered, ultimately, as individual men, or they may be two or more ſmaller bodies, or numbers compoſing theſe larger parts.

The laws which unite theſe ſmaller numbers between themſelves, are diſtinct from thoſe which unite the larger parts (3) compounded of theſe ſmaller.

Alſo each of theſe ſmaller numbers have their component parts, and the laws by which the component parts of each ſmaller number are united between themſelves, are diſtinct from

from the laws by which thoſe ſmaller parts are united to one another.

VIII. It is evident this ſeries and mode of diviſion may be continued till the component parts of the laſt diviſion become neceſſarily individual men, and then the diviſion muſt ceaſe.

It is evident alſo that the greater is the original number of the body in which the diviſion was begun, the more numerous will be the ſteps of the diviſion.

IX. Theſe diviſions of any body of men, afford a diſtinction of laws, into general and local, reſpecting the body.

For firſt, if all the individuals, collectively, eſtabliſh laws, each are mutually bound thereby.

Second, if any ſmaller bodies, component parts of the whole body, eſtabliſh the laws, the laws binding each of theſe contracting parts concerned in eſtabliſhing them, bind alſo the individuals compoſing thoſe parts, that is the whole body. So that the laws which cement or unite the whole body, are, in regard to that body, general laws.

Each of the component parts of the whole, being itſelf a number, and a body, has its diſtinct

diſtinct laws of union, determined within itſelf; and theſe, relative to the whole body, are local, extending only to a certain part of the body; and theſe local laws are more limited as the parts are ſmaller to which they belong.

X. In all ſtates theſe various diviſions are found, and theſe general and local laws. The laws of the realm, or of the ſtate, formed by the collective body, or by thoſe diviſions which compoſe it.

The laws of particular diviſions, or provinces, cities, particular courts, ſocieties, governments; the laws of each pariſh, each ſmall ſociety, or club; and finally, of every maſter of a family, and father of children.

XI. All theſe compoſe the ſyſtem by which the whole body is united. For though the general laws actually unite the whole, each particular law ſtrengthens that union in its particular part, and thus increaſes the whole union.

XII. Laws, or conditions of union, are determined by the relations of the parties they ſerve to unite:

And the reſpective benefits of the laws to the parties by the ſole relation of power between them.

XIII. There

XIII. There are certain relations univerſal, and which determine certain laws, to be univerſally terms of union, whenever men unite. Thoſe which place every man's life in the power of any other, by the conſtitution of our bodies. The natural relations of property. Hence, in every Union, refraining from perſonal injuries, and from infringements on property, are part of the conditions, and no union could ſubſiſt independant on theſe conditions. Such laws may therefore be called UNIVERSAL, as belonging to all Unions; and FUNDAMENTAL as the baſis of all.

XIV. All laws, general or local, (9) contain theſe which are fundamental and univerſal; but they contain others which are not fundamental or univerſal, ariſing from particular relations; and thoſe laws may be called in diſtinction from thoſe in 13. SECONDARY and PARTICULAR. Laws which are branches of the univerſal, may be ſecondary and particular; the law againſt forgery, is a branch of the law of property; but it ariſes from particular relations of commerce, and is a particular law.

XV. Particular

XV. Particular laws are neceſſary or arbitrary. The law againſt forgery is neceſſary. It has a neceſſary connection with the general law of property, which would be imperfect without it. Game laws are arbitrary; for they have no neceſſary connection with the general law of property, they are branches not ariſing from, but added to it; and the law of property would be perfect without them.

XVI. All the parties concerned in eſtabliſhing any law, ſupport their particular intereſts with what influence they have.

XVII. We will firſt conſider a body of men as compoſed of individuals, and not of any ſmall bodies or unions, and ſee what laws may thence ariſe.

XVIII. Firſt, there will ariſe the fundamental and univerſal laws reſpecting Perſons and Property, and ſuch diviſions of theſe as particular circumſtances lead to (14).

And whatever other particular laws, neceſſary or arbitrary may ariſe, they will be equal to all.

XIX. But among any number, even very ſmall, ſmall unions almoſt neceſſarily ariſe;

for the whole quantity of intereſt admits of any unequal diviſions, and every part deſires an undue proportion of intereſt. No individual alone can expect this; men muſt join, and form a number, part of the whole, in order by the mutual aid they can give, to procure for that number an undue proportion of the common ſtock. Particular cauſes determine what individuals ſhall form ſuch an union, and other parts unite from the ſame motives, as well as to reſiſt the former. The contrary intereſts ariſing from the deſire of an undue proportion of the whole good, is always maintained by unions, not by individuals.

This diviſion of ſociety into ſmall unions, and of ſmall unions into ſmaller, reaches to individuals.

For every individual's intereſt is immediately diſtinct, and oppoſed to every other's in the diviſion of goods; ſo that unions are only maintained by the future intereſts which men cannot ſingly purſue.

XX. Every union has, then, ſmall unions for its component parts, except it conſiſt of two individuals ſolely, for if it conſiſt of three,

three, two may form a ſmaller union, a component part.

XXI. But the ſmaller unions, (20) into which every union is diſpoſed to run, muſt be diſtinguiſhed from the whole unions: for theſe ſmaller ones, though diſtinct, are not ſeperate, they remain component parts, remain united. They are united in a common intereſt; they are diſtinguiſhed as parts, each ſeeking, more than its due proportion of good. But it is not the ultimate parts, or individual men, who ſingly engage in oppoſition to each other; all attempt their deſign in conjunction with ſome other.

XXII. Amidſt the variety of intereſts in ſociety, different intereſts, unite different individuals, and make new combinations. A man united with one party in one intereſt, is united with another, in another. And thus, every member of every diſtinct union, is alſo a member of other unions, in other intereſts. Thus they combine infinitely. Intereſts may change, the ſtronger become the weaker, and thus every thing waver and fluctuate.

XXIII.

XXIII. Theſe ſmaller unions henceforth we ſhall call PARTIES.

XXIV. Suppoſe a ſmall union, in which no party materially exceeds any other; and in each party no individual has any permanent decided authority: this is a ſtate of equality.

XXV. Suppoſe, again, the parties to be nearly equal, but that each party has a head, or leader, whoſe authority exceeds all the other individuals of his party. We ſuppoſe the union ſmall, and the parties the ſmalleſt poſſible: the heads of parties then become ſo, by their perſonal ſuperiority or riches. The influence of riches, bravery, ſpirit, or capacity, makes the others cede to him, and he dictates to the party. The union is then a union of heads of parties.

Its nature is ariſtocratical.

XXVI. Amongſt the parties one party may be ſuperior to the reſt, from its riches, number, unity, &c. This party will then dictate to, and rule the reſt.

If this party conſiſt of equals, as component parts, each individual will partake equally of the whole power, and its nature will be ariſtocratical.

XXVII.

XXVII. Theſe varieties give two ſpecies of ariſtocracy, one, in which heads of parties, diſtinct and independant, unite the influence each has in himſelf. The other, where the whole influence of government is common to a number, and each individual head, chief, or noble, partakes only his ſhare of a maſs of power that is blended among them all, having no influence ſingly and alone. The one is exemplified in the feudal ariſtocracy. The other in thoſe of Venice, Genoa, and England.

XXVIII. In the ariſtocracy, one party or chief may be ſuperior to the reſt. This gives birth to a monarchy. There are two ſpecies of monarchy, from the two ſpecies of ariſtocracy. An head in the feudal ariſtocracy, is one, King, or Lord Paramount.

An head in the party which forms the other ariſtocracy, is another ſpecies of monarchy, like thoſe at preſent of France and England.

XXIX. Theſe are the varieties in which the governing influence over numbers may appear.

All theſe varieties may appear in a very ſmall number, as one hundred men. Ten parties may be formed, each of ten men: all the parties and all the individuals, being nearly equal.

Or

Or all the parties equal, and each party having an head, forming a body of ten chiefs, each chief governing his part, and the ten governing the whole. Or one party governing the others, and each chief of that governing party equal among themſelves, and ſharing each a part of the whole government: of the ten, ſo governing, in either of the two above mentioned ways, one may be a ſuperior, or king.

XXX. If then a number forming an whole union, conſiſt of ten hundred, each hundred may have any of the above modes of government, and the government of each number be united into one government. If the ten governments are all ſimilar, the united one formed by them will have the ſame nature with them. If different, the united one will be a mixt government in its nature. And as numbers increaſe, the combination may go on to infinity.

XXXI. Therefore every large government is a combination of ſmaller; for the large union is a combination of ſmaller unions or parties, and each party has its government.

XXXII. We have conſidered theſe varieties of government only as ſerving to inveſtigate laws.

XXXIII.

XXXIII. Law is every where the rule of government. It has been defined the condition of union; but this is, in effect, the rule of government. Union conſiſts in government. The government creates the union. The rule of government is therefore the condition of union.

XXXIV. Every party is a ſmall government, while it ſubſiſts; but parties are ſo fluctuating and uncertain, as to acquire no fixed permanent character of government.

But it is certain each party is an union of intereſt. And the unity conſiſts either in the concurrence of numbers to the will of a majority of them, or in their agreement in one will, or in ſubmiſſion to an head, or a few heads. Now the concurring wills of the whole, or of the majority, or of the heads, or the will of a ſingle head, is the rule of the party, is the condition of its union: and this is the rule of government.

XXXV. Parties are to be conſidered in two ways; as originally whole unions combined together; or as diviſions of a whole formed ſubſequent to the exiſtence of the whole. In the former, ſeperate laws pre-exiſted in the original

original ſeperate unions; and the re-unions gave riſe to new laws of union. In the latter; laws pre-exiſted in the whole, and the laws of the ſubſequent parties were alſo ſubſequent.

XXXVI. The firſt law is that which determines where the legiſlative power ſhall reſt.

Now all will deſire this power; all will exert their influence to hold it; and it will either reſt equally diffuſed among all; or it will receed to that part where the ſtrongeſt influence directs it.

XXXVII. The determination then, of the place of reſidence of the legiſlative power is by a ſtruggle of influence or authority, and not by a law; for this very determination is the firſt law, and has none prior to it.

XXXVIII. That influence determined, and the ſtruggle over, the iſſue of the ſtruggle is the preciſe condition on which all parties reſt at peace, or in equilibrium. The ceſſation of conteſt is on all hands conſent. It is a condition of peace, which condition determines the firſt ſtruggle of law, where the power of making laws ſhall reſt.

XXXIX. We may ſuppoſe two things; either this condition is underſtood, only; or

it

it is expreſſed. It may be expreſſed in writing, confirmed publicly, with ſolemnity, calling in religion, oaths, ceremonials on either part, for its ſecurity.

If it be ſimply underſtood; then as the influence, by the fluctuation of human affairs changes, the ſeat of legiſlation readily changes too, always receeding to that part where the influence is ſtrongeſt.

If it be expreſſed, and religious obligations be called in, then thoſe obligations become a new influence. If, then, the firſt influence of power changes, theſe religious obligations forbid thoſe, who by theſe changes, might aſſume a part of the legiſlation, from attempting to do ſo. And thus the force of thoſe obligations reſtrains the tendency to a change of the ſeat of legiſlation, and gives it ſome permanency. This permanency, adds habit, by which alſo it is ſtrengthened; and long habit gives the ſanction of antiquity, a new ſource of permanency. To theſe oaths, habit and antiquity, is annexed an idea or ſentiment of right.

And thus the legiſlation, at firſt belonging

ſolely to POWER, becomes by theſe adventitious principles, to claim a foundation in RIGHT.

XL. A queſtion of legiſlative power may ariſe in two ways. People aſſembling together and forming a ſociety, new and original. Or the diſſolution of the ties and obligations (39) which held permanent the legiſlative power in an old ſociety.

The excluded part of the body may acquire ſuch influence ſuperior to the legiſlative, or to be able effectually to make a new arrangement beneficial to themſelves, and this temptation may overweigh the objection of right. (39)

Or the legiſlature may ſo oppreſs the other parts of the body, that rage and diſtreſs may over-ballance thoſe obligations.

The ſtruggle renewed, the ties are broken, and the ſeat of legiſlation again is determined by power, the ſame as at firſt. (a)

XLI.

(a) It was little imagined, when the above was written in 1782, that in ſo few years, the foregoing doctrines would meet with ſo grand, and at the ſame time, ſo complete an illuſtration as the late changes in France afford of it. All the world ſee that the new arrangements are the

XLI. This determination, which indeed is not a law, is termed the CONSTITUTION of a ſtate.

XLII. The conſtitution is ſettled on certain conditions. The legiſlative power or office, is conceeded, ſuppoſe to a certain part of the whole. This is becauſe the conceeding part has not influence enough oppoſed to the other, to with-hold this iſſue of things. It may yet have influence enough to engage the other to moderation in its exerciſe. And the expreſs conceſſion of one by oaths, &c. to this legiſlative authority, is accompanied with expreſs

the iſſue of a ſtruggle for power; and that they are marked out preciſely by the points of equilibrium, where contending powers reſt. Ancient right is annihilated in this new organization of a chaotic ſtate. Power there is the only law. Right, if regarded at all, is not ſo from any veneration paid it, but as the meer ſound is made an inſtrument of power. The perſon of the Monarch would be diveſted of all its fictitious ſplendor with as little ceremony as it is of its ſubſtantial dignity, but that this ſhadowy ſemblance, ſeems, from the force of habit, to attach mens minds to it; and, the King's name, as a tower of ſtrength, is an inſtrument of the power of thoſe who have poſſeſſion of his perſon. This ſtate of things is neceſſary in the firſt formation of government.

expreſs oaths on the part of the other, to keep the exerciſe of it within certain limits defined.

XLIII. Legiſlation taken comprehenſively, has ſeveral parts.

It is directing the whole body at the will of the legiſlating part, ſuch points excepted as are excluded in the conſtitution, where the will of the other party has weight to limit the legiſlative right.

Legiſlation *is the direction of the agency of the body, in which the legiſlative power operates*, Either by rules extending to all, or by local and partial rules. Either by permanent rules, or by temporary decrees. Either it regards the interior of the body, or its relations exterior to it. When laws are made, all the ſteps taken in the execution of them, are by other laws, which reſpect alone thoſe appointed to that executive offic. The levying troops is by local laws. The ſending them on any ſervice, is by local laws. In fine, the legiſlative power is generally diſtinguiſhed from the judicative and the executive; but theſe latter are only branches of the former, and are neceſſarily comprehended in them, as parts in their whole.

XLIV.

XLIV. The legiſlative power is to be conſidered as the ſuperior among oppoſed powers. But this character of ſuperiority, is diſtinct from the legiſlative character.

Legiſlation is neceſſary in ſociety. A ſuperior party is not neceſſary. There may be no ſuperior party, yet there muſt be a legiſlature. In this caſe the whole body are the legiſlature. If a part legiſlate, a benefit to that part attends its legiſlative character. Any ſuperior part will therefore poſſeſs itſelf of that benefit.

XLV. The benefits attending legiſlation are theſe:

1ſt. The legiſlatiure is not bound by its own laws, the conſtitution only binds it: the compact, by which its power is aſſigned. It has laws for its own body, by which its members are bound. Natural laws bind it. Not its own political and arbitrary laws. (b)

XLVI.

(b) This is ſpoken of the legiſlature, collectively, not of its component parts. In England, the King, and every Member of either Houſe, is bound by the laws. But the King, and both Houſes of Parliament, conſidered as one power, is not bound by the laws it makes; otherwiſe it could never reverſe any law it had made.

XLVI. The legiſlature is either a few heads of a party, or a numerous party. If a few, each has a large ſhare of power. If many, each, has leſs. In a numerous legiſlature the individuals may be neceſſarily ſubject to the political and arbitrary laws of the whole legiſlature. The policy of the whole may forbid to exempt ſo many individuals, even of its own body, from thoſe laws.

Thus, if a whole ſociety legiſlate, every man is a member of the legiſlature, yet every one is ſubject to all the laws.

But the whole legiſlature cannot be ſubject to the laws. A whole body of people in a democracy are not ſubject to the laws, though each individual is. Then if the number compoſing the legiſlature be ſmall, each one has a large ſhare of the legiſlative power; and each one comes nearer to the exemption which always belongs to the whole. The whole legiſlature may, in its laws, exempt its own members, and in ſo ſmall a number, without any political evil, the whole legiſlative body always having its own proper laws for its members. (c) This is one benefit of legiſlation.

XLVII.

(c) All privileges attached to perſon or office, are exam-

XLVII. Another benefit of legiſlation is, that as it is neceſſary there ſhould be a legiſlature ſo it is neceſſary that a ſmall part of the whole body ſhould always be ſelected, if not for the making general laws, at leaſt for judging and executing. If the whole body legiſlate in eſſential and general points, a part muſt legiſlate in particular caſes. Magiſtrates muſt always exiſt, with peculiar powers, which, however limited, are truly legiſlative, and the magiſtrates muſt be always maintained at the public expence, and maintained in dignity.

The legiſlature will have then the benefit of the magiſtracy within itſelf, and the benefits attending it.

XLVIII. A ſuperior party, meerly as ſuch, may extort from the other part certain advantages, proportional to its ſuperiority; but this extortion will have nothing to reconcile

ples and proofs of this remark. The royal prerogative, the privileges of parliament, of judicial courts, of magiſtrates, and practitioners in the law, are exemptions from the obligation and force of general laws, granted by the legiſlature to particular characters. Game laws are another example.

concile itſelf to mens minds. It is always the meer extortion of power, ever obnoxious, and which men ever ſeek occaſion to ſhake off. But the ſuperior party aſſuming the legiſlation and the magiſtracy, join, in themſelves, what is neceſſary and uſeful, to what is not ſo. They make laws, and laws are neceſſary. They are magiſtrates, and magiſtrates are neceſſary. The men then, the party, can hardly be ſeparated from the office. Would another party endeavour to reduce this to a level with the reſt. In oppoſing the men it oppoſes the legiſlation, the depoſitary of the laws, the magiſtracy: and thus affects the fundamentals of ſociety. The whole community are alarmed at theſe dangers. And few dare engage in ſuch an attempt. (d) Thus the characters this party aſſume are their ſecurity.

And this is a third benefit attending the conjoining the magiſtracy with ſuperiority of party.

XLIX.

(d) Unleſs they can cloak ambitious views under the maſk of patriotiſm; unleſs they can advance at leaſt, plauſible charges of miſconduct in office, and endeavour to ſupplant thoſe in power under profeſſions of greater talents, zeal and fidelity, in the public ſervice.

XLIX. Laws take a different character as they are made by a whole body, by a large part; by ſmaller and ſmaller parts, and by an individual:

We ſhould conſider what is common to theſe different ſtates; and firſt, natural laws are common to all.

Political laws are partly common and partly diſtinct.

Political laws are intended to direct labour and commerce, ſo as to produce the greateſt riches; and to direct the ſtrength of the nation, ſo as to produce the greateſt ſecurity within, and from without. Thus far, theſe objects are common to every ſtate of legiſlation, whether the whole or any part legiſlate.

And thus far we have a ground for ſuch laws as depend ſolely on the condition of any nation, relative to its ſoil, freedom, climate, and to neighbouring nations, and independant of all varieties of its own government.

L. Other political laws regard the relations of part to part in the ſociety, and the diviſion of its goods; and theſe laws vary according as the part which legiſlates is greater or leſs

in relation to the whole. In like manner vary the laws which are purely arbitrary.

LI. In ſtrictneſs, legiſlation belongs not *excluſively* to the ſuperior party which poſſeſſes by conſent the legiſlative power. It is only in pre-eminence called legiſlative, as being ſo in a greater degree. The boundaries drawn by compact, aſſign a greater power to this party, than to the other. Aſſign it the name and office of legiſlation. Aſſign it the excluſive authority of denominating its decrees laws. But limits are ſomewhere drawn, beyond which no law of the legiſlature can, agreeably to compact go; and beyond which, none have agreed to obey. Within theſe limits, the other parts, have bargained for a portion of liberty; and its exerciſe is the legiſlation of the people; for within theſe limits they may act conjointly, and eſtabliſh interior law among themſelves, but theſe are not in fact termed law, becauſe eaeh makes his own law, and none can decide for others, nor are the ſmaller number obliged to conform to the greater.

LII. Unions are of two kinds: primary, and ſecondary. Primary unions are thoſe which ſubſiſt of themſelves. Secondary, thoſe which

which ſuppoſe the primary, and depend on them. Primary depend on an intereſt common to a whole number; ſecondary depend on the partition of the whole intereſt into parts, among parts of the whole union. Secondary unions are ſuch as would ceaſe to exiſt if the primary were diſſolved.

LIII. Whole unions are always primary; their parts may be primary or ſecondary. Lordſhips and baronies are primary unions; many of them may unite in one large primary union; diſſolve the monarchy, the baronies ſtill ſubſiſt. In every union, a part is voluntary; part conſtrained; the former is the inſtrument of the latter; the latter the object of the former; theſe are the ſecondary unions, for they ſupport the primary and are ſupported by it.

LIV. Laws are determinations of one party, obligatory on another. Authority is the obligation of law.

If two parties be conſidered as each poſſeſſed of an authority oppoſed to the other, laws may be mutual in the ratio of the authority. The authority is a whole ſum of influence on a mind. Pain and loſs is a contrary influence,

influence. Authority cannot impoſe a pain greater than itſelf.

LV. The pain or loſs authority can impoſe, conſidered as one ſum, may conſiſt in various particulars, and be variouſly diverſified. Theſe particulars are laws. In whatever particulars an authority can impoſe pain on another, ſo that the ſum of all the pains, is leſs than the authority; ſo far laws are made.

Compacts are mutual laws, preſcribed by a mutual authority. (d)

(d) The idea of founding all government and rights on an original and univerſal compact, either expreſſed or underſtood, is both viſionary and abſurd. It is viſionary, becauſe neither matter of fact nor of evident truth; not matter of fact, becauſe hiſtorical data are wanting; not evident, becauſe it muſt then at all times have been known and acknowledged by all men.

It is abſurd, becauſe we know that real compacts, the moſt ſolemn and authentic, are frequently infringed by the very party contracting, when they can do it with impunity. Therefore, a compact ſaid to have taken place many ages ago, hardly will be binding on thoſe who had no concern in making it; a compact of which the records are not in hiſtory or tradition, but in the reveries of philoſophers who are making theories; of which the documents and deeds are not on parchment or ancient papers, publicly

publicly executed, and carefully depoſited in places held ſacred, ſo as to carry along with them authenticity and authority; but in a book privately and recently printed at the pleaſure of an individual. Men in authority do not acknowledge the force of ſuch ſuppoſed compacts? The arm of actual power is not held down by ſuch cobweb threads of imaginary and inefficient claims?

This doctrine, it may be added, is injurious, becauſe it deſerts the proper and firm ground upon which the rights of men ſhould be conteſted, and expoſes them to danger in an untenable and defenceleſs place, which may be carried by the ſlighteſt aſſault. Men need not look back into antiquity, and explore the uncertain origins of governments, to eſtabliſh their rights; nor meaſure them by the imperfect ſtandard of rude and ignorant periods. They flow along the current of time, co-eval and co-exiſtent with every age and moment, always preſent, always inſeperable from mens exiſtence, an unalienable tenure, a part of their very being. As ſuch, they ſhould be claimed, as ſuch exerted. Every age, every community, every individual, in its own identical name and authority. With ſuch a claim of any man, other men, and other times have no concern. There needs no appeal to written documents, antient uſages, or legal authorities. Truth, like the ſolar rays, is beſt ſeen in its own immediate influence, by direct application of the underſtanding to the ſubject of euquiry; when we ſeek it through the medium of antiquity, and the writings of former times, theſe ſerve like rough and uneven ſurfaces of reflecting bodies, to diſtort every image, and deceive our ſenſes with obſcure or falſe repreſentations of the objects we ſeek to know.

ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS.

No. III.

On Female Seduction.

AMONGST the numerous humane eſtabliſhments that diſtinguiſh this country for the amiable virtue of Benevolence—one is yet wanting to relieve a claſs of unfortunates, who have the moſt powerful claims upon compaſſion, and who hitherto ſeem conſigned to drink the bitter draught of miſery, unmingled, unalleviated with any of thoſe comforts which, in ſome ſmall degree, at leaſt mitigate the ſeverity of misfortune, in almoſt every other form.

I mean

I mean thoſe unhappy women, who having offended againſt the laws of female honour, are ſhut out from the communion of the virtuous part of the ſex, and of the world; and being thus compelled to aſſociate only among each other, as caſual connections ariſe; in ſickneſs or poverty, they ſtand alone, unaided, unbefriended, wanting the ſupport of conſolation, and the endearments of friendſhip. Affliction comes to them in its gloomieſt dreſs, and they taſte ſeverer anguiſh than falls to the lot of other mortals.

Is it for proſtitutes we plead? Does virtue ſhudder at the thought? Humanity will examine their claim, and ſhocked with ſcenes of unutterable woe, will demand in their behalf the common duties of man to man, the boon that affluence owes to miſery: Virtue liſtening, will approve the claim, more dignified in the act, as it is an enemy ſues for grace.

Upon the duties of benevolence, I need not attempt to expatiate. Nature has engraven them deep in every heart, and they operate with involuntary and irreſiſtible impulſe at the ſight of genuine diſtreſs: *that* which here

here makes its appeal to thoſe duties is no impoſtor.

It is too true, that numbers of this claſs of women are loſt to every virtue; that pity ſtands aloof from them, and their ſex juſtly diſowns them with abhorrence.

Even theſe, theſe muſt eat. Heaven, that has filled the earth with ſuch abundance, of which the rich are the ſtewards for the poor, never deſigned that any creature ſhould periſh for want of food. And where is the mortal who will ſtand up and ſay, "my ſoul ſhall not "take pity upon the guilty."

But in this numerous ſociety, there are, it is to be hoped, many whoſe crimes are not of ſo black an hue, and in whom ſome ſparks of virtuous principles ſtill remain unquenched. Many indeed who have but juſt paſt the fatal line, which marked them out among the circle of the impure. Juſt conſigned over by the ſevere doom of inflexible virtue, and the unpitying voice of public cenſure, to infamy and diſgrace; and who too late repenting, and in vain, ſigh in ſecret, and pine to return; but with ſullied fame, no place is found for them amongſt

amongſt the reputable part of their ſex, and the door of mercy is ſhut againſt them for ever.

There are many whoſe lapſe from virtue was more their misfortune than their crime—What defence is proof againſt the arts of ſeduction; and where they ſucceed in betraying unguarded youth, who is it that has not an apology in their own boſoms?

Many, from a combination of circumſtances; youth; inexperience; delicacy of conſtitution; ſuſceptibility of mind, may fail in this only point, though poſſeſſed of every good and lovely quality that can adorn the ſex; thus loſt to ſociety and given up to baſeneſs.

Shall theſe find no advocate? Shall all alike the unfortunate and the guilty, draw the undiſtinguiſhed lot? We withhold not our mite of charity even from the guilty, when want and wretchedneſs plead for them; how much more ſhall humanity be rouſed when beauty has fallen a prey to foul artifice, and virtue and goodneſs lie degraded by the fell deſtroyer's hand.

It is ſurely by an unequal lot that woman is doomed to diſhonour, infamy and ſhame, for a fault which does the partner, the ſeducer to

the crime, no disgrace; but glorying in his success he may pursue new gallantries.

If woman had been formed by nature the stronger vessel, or if her bosom had been less susceptible, and her passions less alive than those of man, that which was in him a venal crime, might in her, more strongly guarded, be justly deemed a shameful weakness.

If in a political view the loss of female honour is of more pernicious consequence to the community than the liberties of the other sex, and therefore it is accounted a trust of a more sacred kind; then is it a trust of a public nature, part of the treasure of the society, to be disposed of only agreeably to its laws, and he who clandestinely receives, is no less guilty than she who treacherously surrenders the deposit.

The judgement that robs a woman of her reputation, precludes her return to virtue; I had almost said robs her of it. The doom that pronounces her dishonoured, consigns her to prostitution; for those who have no character to lose, will be little regardful of their conduct.

Thus by a partial and perhaps too severe judgement, policy defeats its own ends, and renders those wicked who were only weak.——

The

The gentle ſex in one unhappy moment, intail upon their future lives long ſucceeding years of penitence and ſorrow, or of infamy and baſeneſs; while the authors of their ruin eſcape almoſt uncenſured. This conſideration muſt to every man afford the ſtrongeſt motives of generoſity, as well as compaſſion, to join in promoting every benevolent purpoſe in favour of theſe unfortunates, that their condition admits.

And every woman, when ſhe reflects how much misfortune, how much artifice, how much a partial and ſevere cuſtom, how much even amiableneſs itſelf, contribute to increaſe the number of unhappy creatures of her own ſex, will pity while ſhe condemns, and relieve thoſe miſeries, that to an eye of human judgement more than compenſate their faults.

If ſo many circumſtances may be offered to palliate in many inſtances the crime of proſtitution, and ſtrengthen their title to charitable regards; others no leſs cogent may be urged from the ſingular hardſhip of their fate; the numerous evils to which it expoſes them, and their want of thoſe comforts under adverſity that moſt others find.

Let

Let us imagine a young woman's diſtreſs when ſhe firſt feels the ſupport of her parents or friends withdrawn from her. Her acquaintance no longer knowing her; her character blaſted in the world; deſtitute, friendleſs, and unknown, ſhe has to ſeek her ſubſiſtence in the wide world. Perhaps a helpleſs infant, or perhaps the approaching period of child-birth heightens her anguiſh.

Thoſe who have always lived in the midſt of plenty, can ſcarce form a juſt image of the terrors of approaching want. Nor is it eaſy for thoſe who have conſtantly enjoyed the ſocial intercourſe of friendſhip, to realize the anguiſh of the mind when that intercourſe is withdrawn. We are ſo formed, that neither riches nor abilities, nor philoſophy, nor any thing can ſtand in ſtead of the endearing, ſoothing, ſweet intercourſe of friendly offices. But when both at once are loſt, when the moment of adverſity arrives, in which the ſoul wants comfort, to look round in vain, and find no ray, it ſeems to be the very pinnnacle of human woe.

If want and famine are objects of human charity,

If

If anguiſh of mind, remorſe, deſpair, and repentance, entitle a frail mortal to any pitying regard,

If misfortunes, fatal injuries, and cruel wrongs, deſerve redreſs,

If the female ſex, weak and defenceleſs, have a ſuperior title to protection and regard,

If youth, beauty, and lovelineſs, heighten the colourings of diſtreſs, and can move the heart to pity, by impulſes more ſoft, yet more reſiſtleſs,

If to redeem unguarded youthful minds from deep and final ruin, be worthy of chriſtian charity,

If to preſerve ſuch who are juſt verging on the brink of deſtruction, and ſave them to their families, to ſociety, to themſelves, to their God, be an object of public regard, or of private generoſity; if any, or all of theſe motives can touch a benevolent heart, then will the Author hope to ſtand acquitted for obtruding upon the public eye this painful picture of wretchedneſs, which the hand of benevolence will delight to relieve.

It is but too probable that few or none of theſe unfortunate women, can be acquainted with

with happineſs or real joy, and that all are objects truly pitiable.

But there are circumſtances peculiar to their ſituation that makes the hand of adverſity fall heavier on them, and gives them in times of diſtreſs to taſte ſeverer anguiſh, than falls to the lot of others of the unhappy. Shut out from the communion of friends and relations, and driven to aſſociate with the claſs of impures, here are no ties of genuine friendſhip or cordial affection, caſual connections only which in the hour of adverſity are ſhook off, and the unhappy ſtand alone, wanting the ſupport of conſolation, and the endearments of friendſhip, affliction comes to them in its gloomieſt dreſs, and they drink the nauſeous draught of miſery in bitterneſs of ſoul.

All deſtitute and forlorn; ſtung with remorſe, ſhame, and ſorrow, and the keen remembrance of their paſt ſtate; want and famine ſtare them in the face. They look round and find no comforter; in deſpair and bitterneſs of ſoul, they plunge headlong into all the horrors, and all the guilt of proſtitution.

If we regard the unfortunate creature in her new ſtate, we ſee new diſtreſſes prepared for her,

her, ſurrounding her on all hands, and perſecuting her with unwearied ſeverity, through every future ſtage of her life.

We will paſs the conflict which every woman not from her infancy initiated in vice muſt undergo, before ſhe can entirely baniſh virtue and throw off her ſex's modeſty, and with it all her ſex's charms; we will ſuppoſe her mind accommodated to her ſtate, and thoſe ſentiments of delicacy, which could ſerve no purpoſe but to diſtreſs her, laid aſide or ſmothered; for theſe are ſcenes to which no perſon can do juſtice, and only refined minds can adequately conceive.

Indeed it is happily the effect of extreme pain upon both mind and body, to deſtroy the mechaniſm of the finer organs on which it depends: ſo gracious heaven has ordained, to limit the meaſure of human ſufferings; their very exceſs deſtroys the ſuſceptibility of feeling them. And thus when they threaten moſt, they ſtand ſelf defeated.

Initiated, and entered on her new profeſſion, what are the comforts of her life, and what the attendant ills? Let us draw the balance. Peace of mind, chearfulneſs, joy, hope,

hope, truſt, ſecurity, friendſhip, love, ſocial intercourſe, and ſocial delights, "*her* lot for-"bids". Tranſient flaſhes of merriment, and beams of inſipid joy, bachanalian revels, and momentary unſubſtantial pleaſures, are her beſt hopes.

On the other hand, the cares and fears attending a precarious ſubſiſtence; the neceſſity of humiliating meanneſſes, and diſguſting familiarities; expoſure to continual inſults, abuſe, cruelty, impoſition, and fraud, without means of redreſs. If ſickneſs or diſeaſe attack her, they bring a thouſand horrors in their train. Her gains are ſtopped. She contracts debts while her credit laſts. She pawns her valuables, if poſſeſſed of any; ſhe tries a thouſand ſhifts; changes her abode to elude her creditors. Her reſources fail, and the laſt ſtages of meagre want and miſery approach with haſty ſtrides. If her health mends, ſhe makes another eſſay on leſs advantageous grounds. Her ſplendor faded, ſhe moves in an humbler ſphere, or becomes dependant on ſome worthy matron of the ſiſterhood. Here fleeced and extortioned upon, ſubject to every ſpecies of inſult and cruelty from the mother and from her

her gueſts. Compelled to drink with them, her conſtitution is irretrievably gone, and the laſt period of her fate accelerated. As her power of pleaſing declines, ſhe is turned out to make room for new and more promiſing faces. Her faded charms no longer catch the eye ſated with beauty. Humble are her demands, and fallen is her pride. Her ſetting ſun comes on apace; one degree of baſeneſs follows another; diſeaſe again attacks her. Attired in rags and wretchedneſs in her haggard looks, ſhe no longer tempts the libidinous glance; but piteouſly begs the paſſing boon. A nuiſance in the ſtreets; hunted by ſurly watchmen from one dark corner to another; every door ſhut againſt her; every eye turned loathing from her; the wants of nature preſs hard upon her; famiſhed in the midſt of profuſion; ſolitary amidſt paſſing crouds; death at length cloſes the ſad ſcene.

And who is this wretched mortal? Is it a guilty fair one, who throwing off her regards to her ſex's duties, is, by her ſex, juſtly renounced, and her fate the inevitable conſequence of her folly; alas! even theſe, cannot have merited a fate ſo ſevere.

Poſtſcript.

THE foregoing, like moſt of the original Eſſays, is left unfiniſhed. They are detached parts that want their connecting links. The preceding picture of calamity, demands an effort for its removal, and the deſign of ſtating the grievance, was not to give pain to feeling minds by a repreſentation of irremediable ills, but by calling attention to ſuch melancholy facts; to rouſe the benevolent ſpirit of men, to co-operate in the remedy of the evil, whenever it ſhall be undertaken. An attempt entirely to check the illicit commerce of the ſexes, would be abſurdity in the abſtract; but to palliate enormities for which no neceſſary cauſe exiſts; and relieve ſufferings which far outweigh the ſevereſt judgement on their precedent crimes, is a project neither abſurd, nor hopeleſs, and one which the Author hopes to announce at a period not very remote.

Feb. 7, 1790.

Nº II.

ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS OF POLITICS AND SCIENCE.

By ROBERT YOUNG.

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Contents of the First and Second Numbers.

Number I.

On the Poor.
On the Principles of Law.
On Female Seduction.

Number II.

Concerning Government.
On Human Agency.
Diſtinction of Knowledge.

A Third Number is in ſuch forwardneſs, that it is expected to be ready for Publication early in June; and no more will be printed till September or October.

ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS.

No. IV.

Concerning Government.

I. IF men mutually poſſeſs what is mutually an object of deſire, there exiſts a ground of contention. (a)

Def. War is the art and act of contending.

II. The prevalence of one among contenders terminates contention.

III. Whoever prevails in a contention, has a ſuperior power among thoſe who had contended.

Def.

(a) See Note (A) at the end.

Def. The exerciſe of a ſuperior power conſiſts in controlling others, which is the exerciſe of government.

IV. In order to contention, it is neceſſary both that a ground of contention ſhould exiſt, and that men diſpoſed to contend ſhould each have expectations of prevailing.

V. A ſuperior power actually exiſting, may prevent any other power from having hopes of prevailing in a contention.

VI. An exact equality among men, diſpoſed to contention, may prevent either from hopes of prevailing.

VII. A great number of men having as many different intereſts, diſpoſing them each to contend with all the reſt, and all to prevent the prevalence of any one, may prevent any one from hope of prevailing.

VIII. In the three caſes (5) (6) (7) grounds of contention may exiſt, and no contention happen.

IX. When an exact equality of power (6) or a variety of intereſts checking each other (7) prevent contention among men, in whom a ground of contention exiſts; men will mutually ſeek the objects of their deſires, by methods

thods in which they are mutually agreed;—that is by an interchange of goods and benefits, or commerce.

X. There are two different ſtates of men ſpringing from one ſource, viz. a ſtate of ſuperior, governing inferior, and a ſtate of commerce among equals, both ſpringing from the deſire of natural gratifications.

XI. It belongs to the former of theſe ſtates (viz. a ſtate of ſuperior governing inferior) that the ſuperior poſſeſſes and the inferior wants what both equally deſired; and the point of conteſt was eſſentially which ſhould have and which ſhould want.

XII. it belongs to the latter (viz. a ſtate of commerce among equals) that there is an increaſe in the objects of deſire, and that men in the ſame act mutually receive and communicate benefits.

I do not know that theſe two ſtates have been exactly marked by writers, or ſignified by any proper names. I ſhall uſe the terms *a ſtate of ſubordination*, and *a ſtate of reciprocation*, as the beſt I can think of. Subordination being, in fact, the eſſential character of

of one ſtate, and reciprocation of goods and benefits, that of the other.

XIII. If the ſtate of reciprocation (9) were pure and perfect, no ſuperiority, government or controul, could exiſt in it. Mutual agreement and controul being incompatible with each other. But it is not known that ſuch a ſtate of men ever exiſted pure and perfect. For firſt a ground of contention is ſuppoſed to exiſt, and only to be counteracted by ſuch a balance among oppoſite diſpoſitions, as to preſerve the whole at reſt.

But ſuch an equality in ſociety can at any moment ſcarcely be ſuppoſed to be perfect. Secondly, were it ſo at any moment, the changing ſtate of men would ſoon make alterations and deſtroy it. There will therefore be among any body of men, ſtate or community, ſome one party or power, having a diſtinct intereſt, and being in ſome degree ſuperior to any other power, although not in ſuch a degree, as to induce them to open contention for yet greater power. Thirdly, although a balance among men ſhould be ſo nearly equal as to prevent open contention; the grounds of contention,

that

that is, mens deſiring each others poſſeſſions, will operate another way.

Commerce we ſaid is one way that this diſpoſition will operate. Thus a man has more of ſome commodity, than he can employ for his gratification, but of another commodity he is deſtitute; his neighbour abounds in what he wants; but lacks of that of which he poſſeſſes a ſuperfluity. By a mutual exchange each is benefited. But the grounds of commerce may be wanting. A man may have no ſuperfluities to exchange, for the ſuperfluities of another, or none adequate to thoſe of another which he wants. If he cannot ſucceed then by force, or by commerce, he has recourſe to cunning, and by ſecrecy or by deceit, he unawares poſſeſſes himſelf of what he wants. This ſtate of things, though not open contention or hoſtilities, is not far removed from it; and is equally with it oppoſed to the perfect ſtate of reciprocation (9 and 12). The moſt perfect equality of power, cannot obviate this, becauſe power is not oppoſed to power, but cunning and fraud to unguardedneſs and unſuſpicion. For theſe reaſons, a ſtate of reciprocation or mutual agreement, never exiſts pure and perfect.

XIV.

XIV. A ſtate of reciprocation by mutual agreement among men, is a ſtate of union of wills; ſo far therefore as this ſtate prevails, men are united in preſerving it.

XV. If therefore this ſtate (14) is the prevailing ſtate among any body of men, and it is only rendered imperfect by the efforts of contention (13) then the union formed by the agreement, in a ſtate of reciprocation or of commerce, will conſtitute a united part and power in the body, diſtinct from, and oppoſed to that part and power which exerts diſpoſitions to contention, as mentioned (13), and the united power being the power of the prevailing ſtate, will be a ſuperior or governing power over that to which it is oppoſed. (b)

XVI. Hence a government will be found in both the ſtates marked in (10).

XVII. It is eſſential to all governments to diſtinguiſh a body of men into two parts, governing and governed; and theſe two parts are powers oppoſed to each other.

XVIII. It is eſſentially characteriſtic of the government in what we have called a ſtate of ſubordination, that a mutual oppoſition of intereſts prevail between the governing and the

(b) See Note (B)

the governed parts of the ſtate, becauſe the wealth of one is deducted from the other. And the governing have always oppoſed the intereſts of the governed with ſucceſs.

XIX. It is eſſential to the government in the other ſtate of men, that the oppoſition of intereſts between the two parts, commenced with the inferior and governed part, and the power of government, is exerciſed only in ſecuring and defending itſelf.

XX. The former is truly a ſyſtem of attack of men one upon another, wherein the attacking party is ſuperior, and keeps the other ſubordinate. The latter is truly a ſyſtem of defence againſt attacks, wherein the defending party is ſuperior, and checks the deſigns of the other. (a)

(a) By the term governing part, in a ſtate of reciprocation, is not meant the official and executive parts of a government, but that whole united power, wherever found, which ſupports the laws; by the governed, not the body of the people, but all thoſe, wherever found, who oppoſe the laws. The power which ſupports the laws, and the power which oppoſes them, are the contrary powers or parts into which all government divides any body of men. Theſe powers may exiſt in the ſame men; they are not therefore the leſs diſtinct, or the leſs oppoſed to each other.

XXI. The two ſorts of governments belonging to the two ſtates of men deſcribed in the foregoing aphoriſms, are ſimple and original ſpecies. They may be compounded; and in moſt known governments, a mixture of both is found. Each part in ſuch compounds, is to be diſtinguiſhed by its eſſential marks.

XXII. If there is found in any ſtate, two oppoſite powers one governing the other, whereof the inferior ſeeks to injure the ſuperior; and the ſuperior only acts on the principle of prevention and defence, and does not oppoſe its intereſts to thoſe of the inferior. This is one ſpecies of government. If in the ſame ſtate there is alſo found two powers one governing the other, whereof the governing power in the firſt inſtance oppoſes its intereſt, to that of the governed, whom for its own advantage it keeps ſubſervient to it; this is the other ſpecies of government.

XXIII. The better to diſtinguiſh theſe, the circumſtances in which they differ from each other, may be enumerated more at large.

Firſt, of a government in a *ſtate of ſubordination*. 1. The origin of ſuch a government is a deſire of a ſuperiority on the part of the go-

governors. There may have been a mutual aim at ſuperiority, or the governed might have only oppoſed the attempts of the other, or they might not have oppoſed it at all. 2. The governors in this ſort of government, always conſiſt of a ſmall proportion of the whole number in the ſtate. For were it to conſiſt of a large proportion, the governed would be the ſmaller proportion; but the labour and ſervices of the ſmaller proportion would be no ſource of wealth and no object of ambition, when divided among the greater number. The deſire which leads to this government, leads to a monopoly of power: it tends to monarchy. The rival claims of the rich, balancing each other, may eſtabliſh an ariſtocracy; but it is eſſential to it to belong to a few. 3. This government, in the firſt inſtance, divides a ſtate into two orders of men, governing, and governed. The governing is the end; the governed the inſtrument. The one is to labour and amaſs wealth; the other to enjoy it. The one is to be ſubſervient to the luxury, ſplendor and ambition of the other. 4. The natural foundation of this government is the deſire of ſuperiority natural in man.

XXIV.

XXIV. Secondly, of a government in a ſtate of reciprocation.

1. The origin of this government is a deſire of ſuperiority on the part of the governed; for the ſtate of reciprocation, which is here the prevailing ſtate, is a ſyſtem of mutual benefits, inconſiſtent with the ſubſerviency of one part to another. The perfection of this ſtate is therefore inconſiſtent with government which is the ſubſerviency of the weak to the ſtrong. If then a part of the ſociety reject and oppoſe this ſyſtem, they introduce a ſtate of contention, ſo far as their oppoſition goes; they refuſe the reſtraints as far as they can, which a *ſtate of reciprocation* impoſes; they renounce the equal footing in which the general ſyſtem would admit them to ſhare; but in this oppoſition they are inferior; and by their deſire of ſuperiority, they give riſe to a government over themſelves. 2. The governors in this ſort of government always conſiſt of a large proportion of the whole numbers in the ſtate, for a *ſtate of reciprocation* cannot exiſt among any body of men but by the conſent of the greater proportion of their number, ſince if more oppoſed it than conſented to it, the greater number

ber would prevail. The government is precisely the power existing in the united consent of those who join in the state of reciprocation, which are the greater number. 3. The governed in this sort of government in the first instance, divided the state into two orders of men, by separating from, and opposing the original system, creating thereby over themselves a government, which, but for them, would not have existed. In this government is no subserviency of one part to another; the governed seek to make the other part subservient to them, but fail of their purpose. The governors act only on the principle of self defence. 4. The natural foundation of this government is the principle of self preservation.

XXV. In these leading points, the origin, nature, object, and effect, these two governments differ.

XXVI. Of the former species, or a government of subordination, is all governments of the few over the many. For where the few govern the many, first this government cannot possess the characters of our second species. It cannot have arisen from a desire of the many, or the governed to possess the superiority;

ority; had that been the caſe, themſelves would have governed. Secondly, it neceſſarily poſſeſſes the characters of the firſt ſpecies. It muſt have originated in a deſire of ſuperiority in the few, or it would not have happened. The government of the few over the many, muſt be a ſyſtem of attack. A ſettled plan of art only can maintain it. Such a ſyſtem can only be maintained for the advantage of thoſe who carry it on. It can tend only to a ſubordination of the many to the few; for did it not tend to ſubordination it muſt tend to reciprocation of intereſts; in which the government of one part over another would be loſt, and the whole body would become one uniform ſelf governed body.

XXVII. Between governed and governing, no reciprocation can ſubſiſt.

XXVIII. Of the latter ſpecies, or a government in a ſtate of reciprocation, are all popular governments.

The governing and governed are always two diſtinct bodies and powers in a ſtate, oppoſed to each other. In all popular governments, the governed muſt be the ſmaller part. The general body of a ſtate can have little intereſt in

the

the ſubordination of the ſmaller number to them; their labour would be not worth the eſtabliſhiug over them a ſyſtem of government. Theſe muſt ſeek their wealth in their own reciprocal commerce, and their own labour. Government here forms no part of the primary ſyſtem. It is only as their ſyſtem of commerce and labour is interrupted by individuals and the rules eſtabliſhed for the general good are infringed by men individually, that a power ariſes oppoſed to the general ſcheme, oppoſed, but inferior to the power which ſupports that general ſcheme. Theſe two powers are the governing and governed powers. A popular government is the people collectively joining in certain evident principles of general good, and oppoſing by laws, fines, and puniſhments, every thing among themſelves individually, or partially, contrary to thoſe principles.

XXIX. Wherever therefore we find ſubſiſting a King, or a nobility poſſeſſed of a native and hereditary power in a ſtate, and alſo among the people at large a power of ſelf government either in their own perſons or by delegations, theſe two ſpecies of governmeut exiſt in that ſtate; and if theſe two powers be combined

combined into one ſyſtem, theſe two ſpecies of government, are there united into one. There is no where ſo good an exemplification of this doctrine as in our own government.

XXX. In every country, ſtate, or body of men, there exiſts a ſupreme power of controul over that body, ſtate, or country.

XXXI. The ſupreme power in any ſtate may reſt in nearly equal portions divided amongſt the members, or in very unequal portions.

XXXII. The ſupreme power in any ſtate, never reſts wholly with the governing part. For the governed part always poſſeſs a diſtinct and oppoſite power, though inferior to the governing.

XXXIII. The ſum of the governing and governed powers, are always preciſely the ſupreme, or greateſt poſſible ſum of power in any ſtate.

XXXIV. The power of a government which it has to exerciſe acts of government, is not its whole power, as a part of the ſtate diſtinct from the governed, but the exceſs of its power, over that of the governed.

XXXV.

XXXV. In a compound government like that of Great Britain, the King has a power over all the other parts. The Lords have a power over the King and the people; the people have a power over the King and lords.

Let it be ſuppoſed that the power of each of theſe three were equal—Then if each oppoſed the exerciſe of each others power, there would be no government, there being no exceſs among the contending powers.

If any two joined againſt the third, thoſe two would become a government over the third. If all three joined mutually in one object, this conjoined power would become a government over any other power which ſhould oppoſe the principle of its action. Now as all union creates a principle of common good amongſt the united, the object of the junction of theſe three powers, is a common good. It becomes a government as any inferior power ariſes amongſt it, and oppoſed to it, and a government of the ſecond ſpecies, or a government belonging to a ſtate of reciprocation.

XXXVI. Thus, if theſe two ſpecies of governments are joined, and become one power, and one government, the united government

is a government of a ſtate of reciprocation.

XXXVII. The ſpecies of things run inſenſibly one into another, and it is ſeldom in our power to draw the line. In a compounded government, where the power conſiſts of the two original ſpecies, the power of the few, and the power of the many, their conjoined power is ſtill the power of the many; (36) for it is eſſential to the government of the few, that its power and intereſts are diſtinct, and oppoſed to thoſe of the many, their union deſtroys that diſtinction and oppoſition, and the one ſpecies it forms, can be no other than the government of the many: but the two ſpecies of power in this compound, admits of infinite variety in degree. The power of the many, or the power of the few, may be in any given degree greater than the other.

Let it be ſuppoſed the power of the few is the greateſt. In proportion as it exceeds the the other, the government approaches nearer to the ſimple government of the few, or to the firſt ſpecies; but while any degree of power in the many, however ſmall, is united into one power with that of the few, it can never be-

become a government of the firſt ſpecies, for the reaſon juſt now given. The intereſts of the few will preponderate, as the power of the few exceeds the other in the compound; but it will be the greater ſhare of a common intereſt, not an intereſt diſtinct and contrary as in the firſt ſpecies.

Where the diviſion of a common good is unequal in a very great degree, although it cannot be denied to be a common good, it becomes in point of advantage and diſadvantage in ſuch degree near to a diſtinct and oppoſite intereſt between two parties, whereof the ſtronger finds its good in diminiſhing the good of the weaker.

XXXVIII. Things may retain external forms and characters of a certain ſpecies, while its more eſſential qualities are loſt. The power of the few and the power of the many, in a compounded government, may be in outward ſhew equal, or one greater than the other. At the ſame time one may be in reality greater than the other, and that which has leaſt in outward ſhew, may in reality have the greateſt.

Let it be ſuppoſed that the power of the many is in reality much inferior to the power of

of the few, but that it is in outward appearance nearly equal, ſuch a government will, in outward form be a government of the ſecond ſpecies, but in reality it will affect mens intereſts in a great degree as one of the firſt.

Note (A)

There is a principle, which though not expreſſed, will be found virtually aſſumed in the foregoing little tract, as well as all my Eſſays concerning Government, and is a neceſſary key to them. It is this, that the organization of a ſociety is the reſult of certain ſtruggling and contending powers of ſelf-love; not the reſult of any theorems of moral or natural right.

Each individual, and each combination of men, although they may wiſh well to the public, doubtleſs wiſh the beſt too for themſelves. And though they acknowledge the neceſſity of power and ſubordination, yet they may ſay, why may not we as well as any other be in power, and be the inſtruments of public good? In the firſt formation then, while the ſeat of power is doubtful, though all confeſs the neceſſity of ſubordinate members, each for himſelf would chooſe to be the head, and the prevalence in a ſtruggle of power, determines at length, where the ſupreme government ſhall reſt.

Note (B)

The two ſtates here ſpoken of, are not thoſe commonly and nominally diſtinguiſhed by the terms Government and ſubject, but every ſubject of a ſtate, ſo long as he obeys the laws, and helps to enforce them, forms a part of the whole union, which conſtitutes the true and efficient government. It is the infractors of the laws, thoſe who deſire neither to ſupport nor obey them, who in this caſe are called the Governed, becauſe they are reſtrained and compelled to ſubmit to the ſuperior powers of the united force by which the laws and government are upheld.

ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS.

No. V.

On Human Agency.

I. I TURN my thoughts within myself to examine the parts and movements of a machine concealed from the obfervation of my ſenſes, and from the eyes of every other man, and by thought only to be perceived.

II. Though not an object of ſenſe, the reality of the machine I ſeek to unfold, is more certain to me, than are thoſe things I ſee, and hear, and touch; for it is the ſeeing, hearing, touching,

touching, I ſeek to examine. I only know external objects by ſeeing, hearing, feeling; but that I ſee, and hear, and feel, I know ſtill more aſſuredly, than I know the objects which they ſerve as mediums to inform me of. My ſenſations preſent objects to me, and my knowledge is on their teſtimony. But no medium conveys to me my ſenſations. There is nothing between my knowledge and them. I know them in and by themſelves, and they exiſt but in my knowledge of them.

Beſides my ſenſations there are many other affections within me, which are in like manner their own evidence.

III. The firſt thing a man ſhould regard in any undertaking, is the means neceſſary, and the inſtruments he employs to attain his end.—While I am propoſing to inveſtigate my internal frame, it is by an effort of that frame itſelf, that I propoſe this inveſtigation. The means I employ is alſo the end I would attain. I ſeek to know certain things, among them is my ability to know. The I who act, is the very thing in queſtion; myſelf examines myſelf.

IV. My THOUGHT comprehends all other parts of myſelf. I WILL to employ my thought

in

in develloping thoſe parts. In the reſult of thoſe thoughts I will to KNOW myſelf. Here are three diſtinct operations with which the buſineſs is begun, and to which it tends; the end I ſeek to know; the means I, are my thoughts; the impelling agent my will. My will is my action; my thought is my inſtrument. At the ſame time I know that I think, and that I will, and from the exerciſe of my thoughts, the reſult of them I alſo know.

V. I find two ſorts of objects about which I think, wholly different between themſelves, only agreeing in this, that they do not follow on my *will*, but are independant of it, and that I think about and know them both.

The diſtinctions of one ſort are colour, figure, magnitude, motion. In the other we ſee neither of theſe; we feel them within us: the paſſions, love, hatred, &c.

I find a circumſcribed being, having colour, figure, magnitude, and motion, to which I have an intimate and cloſe relation, and attachment, which does not think but through and by means of which my thoughts receive objects to dwell upon. It is by means of this, I perceive colour, figure, magnitude and motion,

tion, in beings about it, and ſpace or diſtance for motion. This being alſo is the means of preſenting to me the ſame qualities in itſelf. As I know bodies about me by my bodily organs; ſo by its own organs I know itſelf.

All the knowledge I receive through the medium of my body, are called SENSATIONS.

VI. My ſenſations which I trace from without me; my paſſions which ariſe within me, are alike independant on my thought or my will. They are prior to thought and its baſis; for in every thought I can trace a ſenſation or a paſſion as its ſubject.

I feel the preſence of a ſenſation or a paſſion; the feeling is my knowledge, or conſciouſneſs of my exiſtence.

In the abſence of ſenſations or paſſions, which I have felt, I perceive preſent to me reſemblances of thoſe feelings: theſe are called IDEAS. My perceiving ideas is alſo my knowledge of my exiſtence; but there is a difference between feeling and the perceiving ideas: the feeling a ſenſation or paſſion is an abſolute condition of my being, complete in itſelf: a perception of an idea is a relative condition; it is relative to a feeling; the idea exiſts only

in relation to, and in consequence of the feeling; *sensations*, *passions*, *ideas*, may all be termed IMPRESSIONS, and distinguished as *primary* and *secondary*.

It is probable the difference between feeling which is a primary impression, and perceiving which is a secondary one, is a difference only in degree. Perceiving is only a more refined feeling of the images of primary feelings.

VII. I cannot at my *will* produce in myself any feeling. The sensations depend on the presence of external things. The passions have a connection with sensations, and I cannot command their presence; but I can command *ideas*, and they obey my *will*. My perception of ideas is THOUGHT. A continued perception of ideas is more properly THOUGHT. It is a prolongation of, or a number of perceptions connected.

I can recal to my perceptions ideas of past feelings; or they may recur without my act. This faculty is called MEMORY.

VIII. Over my feelings, when present, I have no command, I am a passive subject of their impression. Of my ideas, I am in a great degree the master. I not only can call or dismiss

miſs one or another, but I can change their form, reſolve, compound them, and make of them a new world, my ſole creation, in which I am uncontroled maſter, and where no being can obtrude upon my ſovereignty. I receive a number of diſtinct ideas combined in one connecting ſubſtance; as in one continued figure I receive the idea of certain figures, colours, odors, taſtes, and other qualities. I am not maſter of my feelings to receive the impreſſion otherwiſe than as objects are adapted to give it; but having got the impreſſion, of ſo many diſtinct ſenſations combined, I can, in my idea, diſunite them, and think on any apart; or I can bring together, and combine at my pleaſure, ideas never received in union, forming of ſimple images of ſenſation, compound images, to which no actual ſenſation anſwers, and which exiſt only in the creation of my thought. This power is termed IMAGINATION or FANCY. The reſolution of ideas into more ſimple parts, is called ABSTRACTION.

IX. In two or more ideas, I can perceive what does not belong to either of them a part, to wit, ſome *relation*. Of magnitude, or number,

ber, ſuch an one is *equal*, *greater*, or *leſs*, than ſuch an other. Of figures, ſounds, taſtes, &c. ſuch are *ſimilar*, or *diſſimilar*, to ſuch others. Of time or ſpace, this portion is *larger* or *greater* than that. Of motion this is *quicker* or *ſlower* than that; is in the *ſame direction*, in a *contrary one*, in an *oblique one*. Of any changes in things, one *preceeds*, another *follows*; one is a *cauſe*, another is an *effect*.

I ſaid perception of *ideas* might be called a refined ſenſe of feeling; (6) perception of *relation* cannot. The ideas are impreſſions; the relations are not becauſe they do not belong to the ideas: Have I an idea of a larger and a ſmaller globe? The relation larger and ſmaller, do not belong to either idea of the globes, for by getting an idea of two other globes larger than the largeſt, and ſmaller than the ſmalleſt, the globe which had firſt the relation of larger, will have that of ſmaller to the new globe, and the ſmaller will become larger in relation to the one leſs to it; the relation then of either globe can be deſtroyed while the idea of the globe remains unchanged; it therefore does not belong to the ideas. The knowledge of relations,

tions, is then by the pure faculty of PERCEPTION, in which *feeling* is totally excluded.

X. We may perceive relations connected in a chain; thus ſeveral ideas may ſucceſſively be perceived to be related, the firſt to one following it in the order of perception; the ſecond to the firſt and to one coming after it, this on both ſides to the one before, and to a ſucceeding one, and ſo on till we come to a laſt idea; ſo that taking away in any part a middle idea, the relation between thoſe on each ſide, is not perceived, nor is any relation perceived between the firſt and laſt, but by means of the intermediate links, which being preſerved uninterrupted, the relation between any part and any other, may be traced.

This act of connecting perceptions in a chain is called REASONING.

XI. The perception as well of relations as of ideas, is termed THOUGHT. A ſingle perception of an idea or relation is commonly termed a perception rather than a thought, but either term may be uſed. I call THOUGHT then, in general, the perceiving faculty. And it appears from the foregoing examination, that

memory,

memory, *imagination* and *reaſon*, are only different conditions or methods of THOUGHT. The general faculty which comprehends many connected reaſonings and is in a manner the magazine of reaſon, imagination, thought and memory, is the *underſtanding*.

XII. Among my *feelings*, are great variety of kind, but there is a difference which each different kind may have, *agreeable* or *diſagreeable*; taſtes, ſmells, touches, are different kinds of feeling; each of them may be agreeable or diſagreeable: thoſe which are neither agreeable nor diſagreeable, or are both in an equal degree, are *indifferent*. I feel an attraction towards agreeable feelings, and a repulſion from diſagreeable. This attraction and repulſion applied to the intellect, is called DESIRE and REPUGNANCE.

When an agreeable feeling is preſent, deſire is an effort to continue it; when an idea of it only is preſent, it is an impulſe or tendency towards the feeling. When a diſagreeable feeling is preſent, *repugnance* is an effort to remove from it; when its idea is preſent, it is an impulſe to ſhun the feeling.

Deſire

Deſire and repugnance are then motive powers within me, or rather they are two modes or varieties of one motive power; for I deſire to avoid or get rid of what is repugnant to me, and I have a repugnance to loſe or miſs of getting what I deſire. I therefore ſhall uſe the term *deſire*, as a general term for the motive energy I feel within me, except when diſtinct operations require to be expreſſed.

XIII. I can perceive an idea of ſome agreeable feeling at a diſtance from me, and interpoſed between me and it ſeveral ideas which I can perceive connected with each other in the relation of antecedent and conſequent, ſo that the preſence of one ſhall be ſucceeded by another, ultimately bringing the laſt idea on which I fixed my perception. This diſtant view urges me to move through the intermediate ſteps to come at the final attracting power. When a diſagreeable feeling is preſent, I can ſee at a diſtance my freedom from this feeling connected by ſeveral intermediate ſteps. I am urged to move through them by a repulſive power, between the feeling and me, or which is the ſame thing, by a deſire to get rid of my pain.

Plea-

Pleaſure and pain ſometimes expreſs a great degree of agreeable and diſagreeable, they are alſo general terms ſynonimous with theſe.

XIV. In my deſire or impulſe I am paſſive, but in the motion conſequent thereon, I am an agent. I cannot prevent the deſire or impulſe, but I can reſiſt it, and decline to move, and if I yield to it, my own act removes the reſiſtance. I WILL to comply with my *deſire*; my *deſire* is an impreſſion or feeling; my *will* is not impreſſed upon me. I am myſelf its origin; my will is myſelf, in it I am not acted upon, but I act.

My will is then the beginning of motion in my body; it is either immediately, or remotely, the producer of phyſical motion.

XV. I am capable of deſiring many things at once which impel me in different directions; but motion can have at one time but one direction; and while I purſue one deſire, I am removing from another. While the ſubject of different deſires, I am like a body ſolicited at once by different powers, which, reſiſting and oppoſing each other, the body receives a movement in the direction of the ſtrongeſt, and

and with the excefs only of its force above the others.

My defires indeed are not powers phyfically impelling the mafs of my body. The impulfe of defire is on my will, my will is folicited to cede to each, it is urged by each to exert its definitive prerogative in its favour. In fine, it it is I myfelf that defire now this, now that, as the objects pafs in review in my imagination, or both at once I defire this and that. But I know I cannot purfue at once defires that lead me different ways; I do not therefore vainly endeavour to move myfelf in different directions at the fame time; during this oppofition of defires, the phyfical power that gives motion to my body, lies dormant. This principle in the animal oeconomy, is too precious to be thus felf-deftroyed; (a) my intelligence fuftains and decides the conflict; I determine in favour of one direction in preference to the reft, and then the phyfical powers operate.

XVI. I find in this examination of myfelf two principal parts, wholly different in their

 nature,

(a) Moving powers, acting in contrary directions, are mutually deftroyed. See Tract on Motion.

nature, my UNDERSTANDING, and my AGENCY, each of which has its peculiar ſubordinate movements alſo diſtinct from thoſe of the other. My *feelings* are the original ſprings of *action*. *Deſire* and *will* are intermediate operations.

My *perceptions* are firſt principles of my *underſtanding*. *Thought*, *memory*, *fancy*, *reaſoning* are the aſſiſting faculties to this department of the machine.

I find nothing in common, between *underſtanding* and *acting*, between *perceiving*, *thinking*, *imagining*, *reaſoning*; and *feeling*, *deſiring* and *willing*. Theſe are diſtinct movements, ſerving each a ſeperate purpoſe; but their ſeperate purpoſes are combined in one fabric; they are diſtinct parts, yet they are ſtill parts of one whole. It is myſelf that *act*, myſelf alſo that *underſtand*.

Within me then muſt exiſt ſome uniting principle between theſe two.

XVII. My *feelings* and my *perceptions*, are two original powers belonging to the two diſtinct faculties, ACTION and UNDERSTANDING. They are wholly diſſimilar in their nature: when I feel a ſenſation or a paſſion, and when I perceive

ceive a *relation* between two of my ideas, I find a difference between the faculty of feeling and perceiving, not like the difference which may exiſt between two feelings, or between two perceptions.

A different energy performs theſe two operations; but I find them eſſentially related.

I find myſelf the ſame continued conſciouſneſs that *feel* and that *perceive*. The unity of my exiſtence unites theſe operarions, and connects them, however different.

My *feelings*, as they are the firſt ſpring of my *actions*, are the baſis too of my *perceptions*. My ideas are the images and reſemblances of feelings paſt. They are a finer ſort of feelings; a mean between a feeling and a perception. I find a relation between ideas and my power of action; between ideas and deſire; feelings excite deſire but by means of ideas; my deſire is directed to the feeling, only through the medium of the idea of that feeling preſent to me.

Again I find my *ideas* connected with my *perceptions*. I am in doubt if my conſciouſneſs of ideas is a feeling or a perception; it

ſeems

ſeems between both, and to partake of the nature of both. *Relations* of ideas are the pure objects of perception.

Now it is entirely by the faculty I have of perceiving relations between ideas, that I can arrive at the idea of ſome feeling at the end of a connected chain. The idea of this feeling which excites deſire and impels to action, is then come at but by means of my perceptions.

XVIII. Ideas then are the connecting mediums of my perceptions and my feelings. My knowledge of them ſeems to me to partake of the nature of both, in them perception and feeling ſeem to be combined. That they ſerve to connect perceptions and feelings, I know; for my *ideas* are but *images* of my *feelings*. *Relations* between my ideas are the pure objects of my *perceptions*. Of whatever nature then are my ideas, whether feelings, perceptions, or partaking of both, or different from either, their ſerving to connect feeling and perception, is matter of certainty to me.

XIX. In connecting *feeling* and *perception*, the two baſes of the two great faculties of man's *action* and *underſtanding*, the fabrics themſelves are connected, and action and underſtanding

derſtanding ought to have a mutual influence and connection, as, in fact, I experience they have. I find my underſtanding and my action connected; action is the ſubject of reaſon, and reaſon influences action.

It behoves me to examine the nature and grounds of this connection.

XX. My feelings are their own evidence, as my feelings I know them; my underſtanding has no part in them.

My underſtanding is equally independant. I do not feel what I underſtand; I know it as it is my underſtanding. Theſe are two primary and diſtinct modes of knowledge or conſciouſneſs, and my knowledge connects them in itſelf. I know equally what I feel, and what I perceive, but I know in different modes.

How then are faculties ſo diſtinct in their riſe and nature, made to have a mutual influence on each other?

XXI. Although feeling is not an object of underſtanding, nor underſtanding of feeling; actions which proceed ſolely from feeling, are objects of the underſtanding, and the underſtanding

ſtanding influences action: this is the fact we are to examine.

My deſire urges me to act, my feelings generate deſire; but I am not like a maſs of inert matter, ſubjected to moving force, impelled onward in a right line, with a continued motion and a determinate velocity. I am urged in a certain direction, but intelligence accompanies the impulſe I feel. I preſs not blindly on immediately towards the point, againſt obſtacles that lay in the way; I purſue my end with art. I can follow a devious and winding path, ſhunning now this impediment, now that, ſometimes purſuing a contrary direction than that which leads to my object, but I keep it ſtill in view. I ſeek only by my ſeeming wandering the more eaſily to arrive at the end of my purſuit.

1ſt. Then it is my *underſtanding* faculty which perceives the end where my *deſires* lead me. My feelings only are concerned with preſent objects. Feeling alone then neither generates deſire nor impels to motion. For if I have a pleaſant feeling or a painful one, the feeling has no relation to any other part or future ſtate; it is an abſolute and complete condition

dition in itſelf. My underſtanding gives me to compare the paſt and future, accompanied with the preſent feeling, I have ideas of other feelings of the connection of events; if the preſent feeling is pleaſant, I regard its duration; I foreſee its loſs. I perceive what connected ſucceeding events will deprive me of it, and on what circumſtances its prolongation may depend. This view my underſtanding gives me, is neceſſary to produce a deſire. I deſire not the feeling I have, I deſire in regard to the future, now my underſtanding is that which perceives the future. In like manner, if the feeling be painful, I have ideas of pleaſurable ones that may arrive. I have an idea of the abſence of this painful feeling, and of connected events leading thereto. I could not deſire to get rid of pain, if I had no idea relative to a future time, if I did not conceive of the abſence of pain. My deſire always regards the *future*. The future is perceived only by my underſtanding faculty.

In every deſire then, theſe two parts of my frame, feeling and perception, are combined. I cannot deſire any other thing but a feeling; I cannot deſire a preſent feeling, but a future one.

one. I cannot desire a future one, without having its idea, and perceiving the relations woich connect it with me. Feeling is like the foundation of a fabric, without which nothing can be begun to be built. Perceptions are the materials with which it is raised; neither the foundation without materials, nor materials without a foundation, can serve to produce the building.

XXII. 2d. My understanding perceives the intermediate steps or events, which in a connected chain lead to the end I desire. If I have a town in my view; I pursue it not in a direct line, in which I know I may meet with impassable difficulties, but I follow the road, although its winding rout, departs often from the line.

In the first instance then my desire cannot exist without my intelligent faculty; in the second, it is subservient to its accomplishment.

But let us give to each its proper rank and office.——Feeling is still the basis, the source, the essence of desire. I must feel before I can desire. *Feeling* in *idea* is the sole object of *desire*. *Perception* is only an assistant secondary

dary quality, though neceſſary and inſeperable from it.

XXIII. 3d. My underſtanding is concerned in determining the force or degree of deſire.

Deſire has degrees of more or leſs. An idea of pleaſure is an object of deſire. (a) The pleaſure in idea may be more or leſs. All things elſe the ſame I deſire with a force or energy proportioned to the pleaſure. I ſee it through a connected chain of events, which I muſt paſs through to attain it; in each of thoſe events a feeling proper to it is produced in me; it may be pleaſure or pain. The pain through which I muſt paſs, deſtroys ſo much of the impulſe of my deſire. The pleaſure I ſee combined with my purſuit, adds ſo much to it.

The pleaſure ſeen at a diſtance by my underſtanding, is not a ſingle ſolitary ſum of pleaſure. I ſee it neceſſarily combined with intermediate pleaſure and pain: all theſe make up one ſum or reſult, the actual quantity of plea-

 ſure

(a) By pleaſure, I mean here indifferently the acquiſition of a pleaſure, or the getting rid of a pain, which is a relative pleaſure.

ſure which I deſire; but my underſtanding is concerned in forming this reſult, in tracing the connection of events through which I muſt paſs. And this concernment of the underſtanding is inevitable; for I cannot ſee the diſtant pleaſure as connected with me, but I muſt trace alſo the connecting medium; and in that medium, the ideas of the pleaſures and pains I am to meet or receive, neceſſarily preſent themſelves to me. If I form an idea of a great pleaſure, and while my underſtanding directs my ideas through the ſteps I muſt go to attain it, it brings to me ideas of pains greater than the final pleaſure I have in view, my firſt impulſe is wholly deſtroyed, by this ſucceeding view, and I am repelled from my intended purſuit. My underſtanding is the faculty that guided me in this determination. I refer to my feelings in idea to weigh the force or quantity of the ſeveral pains and pleaſures—my intelligence ſhews me their neceſſary connection with each other.

Again, future events are uncertain; although I can trace a pleaſure connected by intermediate events with myſelf; yet in their actual ſucceſſion, that chain may be interrupted, and my

my attainment may fail me. My underſtanding faculty judges of the probability of events, and the probability influences my deſire. If I know of a purſe of gold which was at a certain time left in a certain place, at a diſtance from me; it is worth the labour of going for, if I can perſuade myſelf it is very probable I ſhall find it there; but if it is in a place much expoſed and frequented, and I conclude ſome perſon elſe muſt have got it almoſt as ſoon as it was left, I then do not balance the gold againſt the pain of fetching it, but I balance a very faint hope of attaining it againſt a certain pain, and the pain is the greater. My underſtanding occaſions this concluſion in me.

My deſire is not a general undetermined impulſe; it is an impulſe in a certain direction through certain ſteps to a determined end. Or if I deſire an object which I cannot ſee connected with myſelf, and to which I ſee no path through which I can paſs, it operates not with me as a motive force; my belief of attainment is no leſs neceſſary than an idea of a diſtant pleaſure, in order to impel me onwards to reach it.

Again

Again, diſtance influences my deſires, and of this my underſtanding is the faculty that determines:

Of pleaſures equally great and equally probable, I find the ſtrength with which they ſolicit me is proportioned inverſely to the diſtance at which I ſee them. That which being of the ſame probability, is twice the quantity, attracts me but with an equal force, if it be twice the diſtance.

XXIV. The ſtrength of deſire is then combined of the quantity of pleaſure; and its probability, in a direct ratio, and of its diſtance in an inverſe ratio.

The quantity of pleaſure is ultimately refered to FEELING. My *idea* of a future one, which I deſire, is but an image of a paſt. A pleaſure I never felt, I can have no idea of and cannot deſire; and if I had felt no pleaſure, I could deſire none.

The quantity is a ſum compoſed of ſeveral ſmaller ſums; or a ſum, the reſult of pleaſure and pain combined; (23) the eſtimation of each ſum is refered to *feeling*; but the perception of their being connected together, and

the

the neceſſity of their forming one ſum, is the buſineſs of the *underſtanding*.

The probability, and the diſtance, are wholly the province of the underſtanding. This is the connection my feelings and my perceptions have in determining my actions. In this way my underſtanding and my actions are related; and theſe are the diſtinct provinces and offices of my feeling, and my reaſon therein.

XXV. If feeling be the only motive principle, the ſole baſis of deſire and of action, and therefore every action be ultimately founded on feeling, and the underſtanding act only a ſubordinate part, it muſt be a fundamental error to imagine actions are ever governed by reaſon alone, ſince a feeling, of which reaſon can take no cognizance, is the baſis of all. In every action reaſon has its department, and its limits, beyond which all its endeavours to paſs, are fruitleſs.

XXVI. I diſcover then in myſelf, two grand and diſtinct departments of my being *intelligent* and *active*, and I find parts and powers common to both, and which connect them

them into one ſyſtem of reciprocal influence and dependency. I muſt review theſe parts and their order, and general uſe, before I proceed to a more particular examination.

XXVII. I have enumerated eight diſtinct faculties or powers, under general terms. By faculty and power here, I mean that, whatever it is, by which I know my exiſtence, and any change therein, which I act or ſuffer.

Senſation, paſſion, deſire, will, perception, memory, imagination, reaſon. The four firſt of theſe come under one head of *feeling*; the four latter under one alſo of *thought*; and thus all the faculties are reduced to two. Of each of theſe faculties I have a *conſciouſneſs*. Thus, in my *conſciouſneſs*, the whole machine becomes *united*.

I am conſcious of a difference between the two general heads of faculties, feelings and thought. Feeling is a kind of agitation or movement within me, or ſome impreſſion made upon me; in it I am the ſubject of ſome agency. Thought is void of agitation, movement, or impreſſion. In thought I am conſcious of no ſubjection to an agent.

Feel-

Feeling is a ſomething within me. I am conſcious of it as within me; my conſciouſneſs reſts there. Thought is alſo within me, but it goes to objects without me, or to ſome object different from itſelf.

Feeling is abſolute and perfect in itſelf. I feel—my conſciouſneſs is complete. *Thought* is relative. I think, but I think about ſomething that is not thought. Thought implies ſomething elſe to have preceeded it, to which it belongs; *feeling* does not.

My feelings are a ſeries of events ſucceeding each other in a certain order which I cannot reverſe; in a duration, and with intervals I cannot alter. My thoughts I can arrange and modify, and reverſe, and run through a great number in a ſhort ſpace of time. The one is the actual courſe of my life; the other is a kind of record of the ſame, of which I can reviſe and run over many years in one day.

My feelings have a connection with each other; but it is a connection of production, of cauſe and effects; one feeling may cauſe another. My thoughts have a connection of continuity; one leads to another, but does not create. A feeling productive of another

paſſes

paſſes away, as the other ſucceeds; a connected ſeries of thoughts remain entire. Feelings are connected as ſucceeding times are connected with former ones. Thoughts, as parts of ſpace, or portions of matter, are connected.

XXVIII. In theſe different characters of *feeling* and *thought*, I find my ſenſations, paſſions, deſires, and will, anſwer to feelings. Perception, imagination, memory, and reaſon, to *thought*.

I find the former claſs tend ultimately to *action*, to produce a movement in my body. From ſenſations ariſe paſſions and deſires; from deſires will and action.

The latter claſs tend not to action; they begin and end in thought alone, without any impulſe being produced to movement. I find a ſort of magazine of thoughts laid up in a certain order and connection; and I call this magazine my *underſtanding*: to increaſe this ſtore all my thoughts tend.

The foregoing is an analyſis of the human mind, which, though unfiniſhed, appears to me

me to develop ſome very important parts of the mental oeconomy, hitherto not clearly deſcribed. A great advance will be made towards putting an end to the unprofitable fatigue of infinite controverſies that perplex and puzzle mankind, when the province of *feeling* in debates comes to be fairly diſtinguiſhed from that of *reaſon*. It will then appear that the greater number of verbal conteſts, gloſſed over with a ſpecious ſhow of *reaſoning*, are founded in each of the contending parties in differences of *mental feeling*, about which, as they can never be reconciled, it is abſurd to diſpute. Thus men of different characters and conſtitutions, ſit down after the moſt laborious and even candid inveſtigations, each convinced, as they think of their former opinions, when in fact they retain only thoſe ſentiments that belong to their conſtitution, and with which the underſtanding has nothing to do.

Suppoſe, for example, a man of a ſanguinary and ferocious habit, were debating in a ſenate with one of mild and gentle temperature on ſome point of criminal police; they would doubtleſs reaſon differently, and

come to different concluſions; but the true ground of both their reaſonings would not be as a firſt principle, a ſelf-evident axiom of the underſtanding, but the peculiar temperature of each would be the true and genuine ſpring of the concluſions they would make, and render it impoſſible they ſhould ever agree in their ſentiments. It has been ſaid that many diſputes turn upon words, but not ſufficiently attended to, how many hinge upon men's different conſtitutions and fibres.

ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS.

No. VI.

Diſtinction of Knowledge into Matter of Reaſon and Matter of Opinion.

I. THERE are conſtantly queſtions occurring in human life, which men cannot determine, and in which no argument or proof can avail to reconcile them in the ſame deciſion.

II. There are two grand and diſtinct faculties

ties in man, *feeling* and *thought*. Feeling is his capacity of receiving pleaſure and pain. Thought is his capacity of having preſent reſemblances of feelings, when the feelings are abſent. It is perhaps properly to be termed a more refined feeling, adapted to images or reſemblances of the primary, groſſer and more real feelings. Theſe images of feelings which thought deals in, are called ideas, or notions. Feelings are of two ſorts, one come at by a mediation of our organized bodies, called *ſenſations*; the other without any manifeſt intervention of ſubſtance or organization, called *paſſions*. They are in common termed *feelings*, becauſe they have in common a force, a reality, a vigour, an impulſive agency on the WILL, which *ideas* and thought have not.

It may be ſuppoſed that ſenſation preceeds paſſion; it is certain paſſions reſult from ſenſations; perhaps without ſenſation there could be no paſſion. It is not certain however whether ſenſation and paſſion depend on one and the ſame mechaniſm and principle or not. It appears that paſſions do not reſult immediately from ſenſations; ſenſation is their baſis

and

and groundwork: but thought exerciſed about ſenſations, by ideas, is neceſſary to produce a paſſion. In every paſſion, deſire, averſion, love, hatred, envy, joy, hope, we may find on examination a certain exerciſe of thought about ideas of ſenſations, nor is it poſſible for the paſſion to ſubſiſt without thought. This appears by the paſſion ceaſing when thought intermits in ſleep, and when it is diverted from the ideas, which are the ſubject of the paſſion, either waking or in dreams, to ſome different ideas.

III. In the ſcience of man we muſt admit ſeveral diſtinct parts as firſt principles. In vain have men ſought to combine theſe into one ſyſtem, unfolding the primary laws of our own being.

No very laborious exerciſe of reaſon is neceſſary to aſſure us of this truth, and humiliating as it is, it is our intereſt rather patiently to ſubmit, than fruitleſsly employ that labour in endeavouring to force the eternal bounds of nature, which we may more profitably exert within the ample limits ſhe has allotted to us.

IV. We know we have ſenſation, paſſion, and thought. We would know too the ſciences of theſe affections—what powers, what mechaniſm, what materials, what laws, are employed to produce theſe effects. There are two methods in which we may endeavour to come at this deſirable end. Hypotheſis and experiments.—We try by experiments to aſcertain ſome facts by which we may explain the laws of ſenſation; but every fact we diſcover is itſelf a ſenſation. We labour at the microſcope to diſcover the primary ſtructure of the bodies that communicate, and the organs that receive impreſſions. In theſe we find objects inviſible to the naked eye rendered viſible; but theſe are ſtill objects of ſight. Do we ſeek the cauſe of taſte or ſmell, in ſome object of ſight? Will colour, or figure, for ever diſtinct from taſte and ſmell, teach us their laws? As ſoon will ſmelling at a flower explain to us its colours, as looking at it will explain its ſmell. If one ſenſe will not ſerve to expound another different one, neither will it explain itſelf: we can only renew its efforts; we may diſtinguiſh more accurately between its degrees, but the ſenſe is ſtill the ſame.

Wherever

Wherever we ſeek the origin of the ſenſation, the ſenſation itſelf recurs; wherever we eagerly ſtrive to come at the cauſe, the effect interpoſes, nor can we advance one tittle beyond it.

We receive the facts as primary knowledge, till we are better informed of their laws and powers which produce them.

Between feeling and thought is this diſtinction. Feeling is an actual exiſtence within a man, abſolute and complete in itſelf, and without any connection with other exiſtences. They come into exiſtence and paſs away, being paſt or to come they are not, they are manifeſt only in their preſent exiſtence.

Thought is an actual exiſtence, but has a relation to feeling, and in itſelf has no independant exiſtence. For without feeling we have no ideas, and without ideas thought is not. Thought, as feeling, is only manifeſt in its preſent exiſtence. And when it is paſt or to come, is not. But exiſting relative to feelings, and in that relation only, it is relative to feelings paſt, preſent or to come. Thought like feelings exiſt within a man, but it has a relation to things no longer within him or part

of

of him, while feeling is itſelf a part of a man's exiſtence without relation to any other thing. Thought has a relation not only to a man's feelings which once were, or which will be within him. It has alſo a power of extending itſelf to things altogether without, and diſtinct from a man's ſelf, by ſeperating ideas or images of internal feelings, from the feelings themſelves, and from himſelf, as the ſubject of them, and regarding thoſe ideas apart, as external and independant exiſtences.

In this power of thought we find the ground of the connection that exiſts between different and diſtant men, each of whom in himſelf is wholly incommunicably, and for ever a diſtinct being from every other. Every man's taſte, his ſmell, his viſion, his feeling, his hearing, his joy, his ſorrow, his deſire, is his own, is within himſelf; nor do theſe feelings proceed by any emanations,* by any connecting ties from man to man. If I rejoice in another's joy, if I *partake* his ſorrow, it is *thought* only which effects the communication, nor is it his

* Were I now to treat on this ſubject, I ſhould be more cautious in pronouncing this opinion.

his joy or ſorrow I *partake:* this figurative term muſt not be taken as a philoſophical truth; my feelings are my own, ever diſtinct from his in themſelves, although by the power of thought connected.

Ideas ſhould be diſtinguiſhed into ideas of feelings and of relations.

Ideas of feelings, are themſelves more refined feelings.

Relations are originally pure perception, not feeling. The idea of the perception is the perception itſelf renewed, and not any thing different from it.

The power of thought alone afford a connecting principle among men; for going out of each man's ſelf, and reſting on external images, which may be preſented in common to a number of men, or to all mankind, thoſe images remaining permanent and the ſame, give a ground for a connection of thoughts by a common reference to the ſame ſubjects.

V. In theſe diſtinct faculties of man we find then the grounds both of the uniformity that exiſts among men in ſome things, and the diverſity which appears in others, and why in ſome things inveſtigation and reaſoning

leads to agreement, in others why it never can.

VI. Every queſtion is either of fact or of ſentiment. Of ſome exiſtence, as Alexander the Great; of ſome action, as his killing Clytus—Of ſome relation, as equality or proportion in magnitudes; of co-exiſtence—Of ſucceſſive connected exiſtence—Of reſemblance, &c. the relations no leſs than exiſtence or action, are matter of fact. Queſtions of ſentiment are about men's approbation or diſapprobation of certain things; objects impreſſing our ſenſes, or actions perceived by the intellect. A man perceives a connection between the idea of exiſtence, and a certain being, action, or relation; another perceives no connection between thoſe ideas. One man approves ſome ſenſation or ſome repreſentation; another diſapproves the ſame. In the firſt of theſe caſes two external ideas capable of ſenſible repreſentation are compared together; theſe ſame repreſentations may be common to any number of men; now, if men perceive them differently, it can only be that ſome have a leſs perfect view than others, the ideas themſelves being the ſame; and theſe imperfect

imperfect views may be corrected by more careful obſervation; and men who diſagree in their perceptions concerning the relations of two ideas, may be made to agree by affording each a true perception. But in the ſecond caſe, ſome idea excites a ſentiment in which the perception is not concerned. The ſentiment exiſts only in the man. The queſtion of ſentiment is not whether ſuch an idea produces ſuch a ſentiment in a particular man, that may be eaſily determined, becauſe ſentiments may be manifeſted by external ſigns; a queſtion of ſentiment is whether ſuch an idea deſerves approbation or diſapprobation. In ſome inſtances our approbation and diſapprobation is neceſſary, and admits of no obligation from judgements, as ſome certain taſtes and ſenſations; in others the judgement has a power to influence; we may be brought to approve ſome things we once diſapproved; but the power of forming taſte is not univerſal, nor is it exactly decided what are its limits.

Feeling of all ſorts is complete within a man; ſenſation, paſſion, ſentiment. There is no common reference or ſtandard can be procured

cured to determine if it is different or the ſame in all.

Relations may be the ſame in all, becauſe the relation may be perfectly expreſſed by words, and its leaſt differences known. The ſigns of relation are perfect. The ſigns of feeling imperfect.

VII. Theſe queſtions of taſte and ſentiment are of that kind that men cannot agree in univerſally, and that no proof can apply in to produce agreement. All good or bad as cognizable by us, is relative to us. It is ultimately the power of things, giving us pleaſure or pain. The quality is relative to each man individually. Each man individually is then a diſtinct ſtandard of good and bad. Now, if theſe ſtandards differ, if men have different original ſenſations and ſentiments about the ſame things, no reaſoning can alter this, no new view correct it; becauſe here is no miſtake of perception of an external object, but it is an inward exiſtence not refered to any external object; it is a reality; the difference is not a different knowledge of the ſame things, but is actually two different things. There is nothing in common between men's

men's ſenſations and ſentiments; and when they agree or diſagree, there is no common ſtandard by which to regulate them; each is its own ſtandard.

VIII. Beſides what is original and neceſſary in taſte and ſentiment, a great deal may be formed by habit; this power of habit is ſufficiently known as to the fact; but this comes to the ſame as original formation in regard of its being out of the province of reaſon.

It is only where ſome common ſtandard of taſte or ſentiment is formed among a number that reaſoning can apply.

All reaſoning reſpects things which are matter of fact, but which are not ſelf-evident.—Now all ſenſations and ſentiments exiſt only in their ſelf-evidence. Reaſoning reſpects perceptions about objects perceived; ſenſations and feelings are at once the perception and the object; and as they cannot err, and have nothing without them to which they belong, they are complete, and finiſhed in themſelves, and not ſubjects for reaſoning.

The ſtandard of taſte and ſentiment is not one univerſal ſtandard. There are many ſtandards

dards differing from each other. It is a point in which the majority of any ſet of men who have particular intercourſe together agree; different times, nations, provinces, cities, different combinations of men, town and country, all are found to have different ſtandards of taſte and ſentiments.

In all caſes the particular ſtandard muſt be determined before any reaſoning can be applied concerning it.

IX. Among the majority then of any claſs or combination of men who form the ſtandard of taſte, there will be no diſagreement; between certain individuals who differ from any ſtandard, and between different bodies of men, there will be differences. Between theſe latter there is no ground for any argument or proof, becauſe they are not agreed on principle, and cannot agree, the ſtandard in each being diſtinct and different.

X. The ground of this difference is either a different original conformation, or the conformation which renders men ſubject to differences from habit.

XI. It is to our purpoſe to enquire in what parts

parts of men's nature are found diverſities; and in what parts experience does not evince any difference.

It appears then that in all effects within men, there are varieties—in all ſenſations and feelings. And it is only in abſtracted ideas that they are free from them; becauſe in the one, men are paſſive; in the other they are agents, and form the idea; in this then they may agree, one having defined any abſtract idea, that definition forms the idea, and it is received alike by all, and does not depend on diverſities of confirmation.

All abſtract ideas then, ſenſible or moral, are ſubjects of reaſoning, and afford grounds for proofs—no actual ſenſation, perception or feeling. Certain relations, or connections of abſtract ideas, are the ſubjects of reaſoning; as relations of figure, magnitude, number. The connection of natural powers into cauſe and effect; this branch conſtitutes phyſicks. The moral powers of men, and the relations of certain actions to ſociety; integrity, juſtice, valour, charity; murder, theft, treaſon, are all relations of abſtract ideas, conſtituting the ſcience of morality. All theſe then

then are the province of reaſon, which conſiſts in developing and explaining what lies concealed.

Does a queſtion of right and wrong then turn upon any defined rule—it is a queſtion of a relation of abſtract ideas. But does it turn upon mens internal feelings, there is no ground for argument; for here is nothing concealed to develop. If men's feelings differ, both are notwithſtanding equally real and true. If I approve what another diſapproves, theſe are two diſtinct facts, which nothing can reconcile, and any apparent reconciliation, will be a deception, not a truth.

XII. The different original ſimple feelings in man, appear to be as follows: (1) That which by a general name we may call LOVE, it is a ſenſe of pleaſure connected with the happineſs of another. This ſenſe may be combined with others, or may be ſimple and unmixed; directed to a woman it may be combined with the appetite of the ſexes; it may be combined with any ſelf-intereſt; it ſeems pure directed toward children, from whom we can receive no benefit; toward friends from whom we need none; toward the

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